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Amid deeply polarized discourse over spending choices, Congress has resorted fre-
quently to the particular device of binding “automatic” cuts, a form of Congressional 
precommitment whereby Congress takes steps at time one with the intention of changing 
the likelihood it will make certain choices at time two. I argue that these devices are dis-
ingenuous in two ways. First, legal analysis shows they do not actually bind Congress, 
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even as they claim to. To the extent they have any traction, it is by appealing to our nor-
mative reluctance to flout pre-existing rules, which, in other words, means they work by 
invoking the ideology of “legalism.” Legalism, as defined by political theorist Judith 
Shklar, is the norm privileging rule-following, which is seen as “neutral,” over other forms 
of decision-making, which are “political.” However, in the realm of guns-or-butter spend-
ing choices, the invocation of legalism is disingenuous, since these decisions are deeply 
politically contested. Not only do they purport to bind when they don’t, these Congres-
sional precommitments also purport to be neutral when they are politically purposive ef-
forts to lock-in preferences.  
This article analyzes and debunks the three main methods of precommitment, and 
then applies those findings to sequestration and the Independent Payment Advisory Board 
from the health reform law, to show what happens when we try to make these kinds of 
political decisions by legalistic “automatic cuts” which deceptively purport to be a more 
rule-bound, “neutral” approach. I find that these precommitments amplify the advantages 
of status-quo majorities over minorities, while undercutting the values of transparency 
and coherence. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Affordable Care Act, the culmination of nearly a century of attempts to reform 
the U.S. health system, sought to bring a number of health system dynamics within its 
compass, including the spiraling cost of health care, which is on track to consume nearly 
thirty percent of GDP by 2030. Meanwhile our overall federal budgeting and spending 
processes have veered dangerously off-course. Until the “modest” budget and spending 
deal for fiscal year 2014, Congress had not passed a budget in three years.1 The Govern-
ment was funded through a series of continuing resolutions,2 and the credit rating of the 
United States Treasury has been threatened by repeated debt-ceiling brinksmanship. 
The two problems—health spending and budgeting—are of course inseparable. 
Medicare and Medicaid represent twenty percent (half a trillion USD annually) of federal 
spending, while Social Security, other entitlement spending, and net interest on the debt 
consume another forty-three percent.3 President Obama contended that to solve the deficit 
problem, the nation must solve the health problem first, and to that end he made “bending 
the cost curve” a primary focus of health reform.4 The centerpiece of his efforts has been 
                                                        
 1. Hari Sreenivasan, Budget Battles Aren’t Just About Money, but Different Visions of Government, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics-jan-june13-budget_03-21. 
 2. Suzy Khimm, Senate Democrats promise to pass a budget. Why is this a big deal? WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/20/senate-democrats-promise-to-pass-a-
budget/. 
 3. WALTER OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 44 (7th ed. 2007). 
 4. See President Barack Obama, Address at the Capital Center Visitor Auditorium (Mar. 20, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-house-democratic-congress. See also Pres-
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an agency called the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB). IPAB is a new inde-
pendent agency created by the health reform law5 to devise Medicare cuts that would au-
tomatically take effect to keep program growth no higher than roughly one percent above 
GDP growth.6 
This article puts IPAB, with its much-vaunted automatic cuts, in the context of Con-
gress’ showdowns over the budget. The ongoing budget brawls have featured related leg-
islative tools, particularly automatic sequestration, which imposes across-the-board can-
cellation of budget resources to enforce spending caps. What emerges is a picture of the 
national conversation about our economic and fiscal priorities and the role such tools might 
play in that discourse. I argue that these automatic devices constitute bad faith. First, they 
purport to bind when they cannot. Second, they represent Congressional actors seeking to 
pass-off their political preferences as neutral requirements. These devices are incursions 
of legalism into the political domain, and, as such, suggest the instability of liberalism, 
which depends on this distinction between the just and the good, between law and politics. 
The two examples of sequestration and IPAB are similar insofar as they are both 
precommitment devices whereby Congress acts at time one to change the likelihood it will 
make certain choices at time two.7 There is a lively academic debate in the legal literature 
about whether precommitment devices, a subset of which are called legislative entrench-
ment, should be permitted or not,8 but both sides of the debate agree on the current state 
of the law—they are rarely if ever enforceable. This article seeks to answer the question 
of why Congress uses this technology at all.9 I analyze IPAB and sequestration closely to 
demonstrate how they fail to genuinely constrain Congress at time two. I show that instead, 
they rely for their effect upon the ideology of legalism, formulated by Judith Shklar, as the 
normative belief that conduct should be guided by obedience to rules. This commitment 
to rule-adherence disadvantages rival preferences precisely because under this ideology, 
“decisions seem to be not choices but accepted necessities.”10 But because the rules in this 
case do not bind, the claim of necessity is false, constituting a form of political bad faith. 
In our polarized world, the invocation of legalism through the use of precommitment is a 
potent political weapon, privileging one set of values over competing claims. 
Throughout this piece I use Jon Elster’s definition of precommitment as an act at 
time one by a particular actor to make that same actor’s choice of an option more difficult 
at time two.11 My concern in this project is with Congressional precommitments, and 
                                                        
 5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified 
in scattered sections of titles 26 and 42 of the United States Code). 
 6. The limit is the average of the general urban consumer price index (CPI-urban) and medical CPI in the 
first years IPAB takes effect.  
 7. While some writers may prefer the term “pre-commitment,” I use “precommitment” throughout this piece 
as this spelling is what Jon Elster used in the course of his writing defining and applying the concept. 
 8. Some of the main supporters of permitting entrenchment include Eric Posner and Adrien Vermeule, 
though I will show that their case is internally inconsistent. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative 
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1671 (2002). 
 9. I would like to thank Erin Fuse Brown for suggesting this way of posing the question. 
 10. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 11 (1986). 
 11. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1990) [herein-
after SIRENS]. See also JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND 
CONSTRAINTS (2000) [hereinafter UNBOUND]. 
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therefore with Congress as an actor trying to bind its own actions in the future.12 This 
definition excludes instances of Congress trying to bind other actors. 
In Part I, I introduce the concept of precommitment, first to characterize the common 
phenomenon represented by IPAB, the sequester and its antecedents, but also because 
when the core functions of precommitment are identified, it becomes clear that they match 
the functions served by the law-politics distinction, a distinction which undergirds both 
classical liberalism and its metastatic form, legalism. To understand this distinction and 
how it functions in a political arena like Congress, I introduce Judith Shklar’s account of 
“legalism.” Shklar gives this name to the ideology that conduct should foremost conform 
to rules, and she explains how this norm derives from the paramount importance legalism 
assigns to expunging politics from the conduct it regulates and legitimates; legalism thus 
depends upon the law-politics distinction. Part I therefore lays out the resources I use to 
describe my hypothesis: that Congressional precommitments in our guns-or-butter deci-
sions, which the sequester and IPAB exemplify, are expressions of legalism, expressions 
of the ideology that rule-following, unlike political choice in all its partiality, is even-
handed and should therefore be privileged. 
In Part II, I begin to test that hypothesis against examples of Congressional precom-
mitments. I identify three principal methods of Congressional precommitment, and three 
important cases, each of which employ multiple precommitment methods at once. I show 
first that these Congressional examples overclaim: they cannot actually bind at time two, 
which poses the central question of why Congress would use these tools. My second find-
ing answers that question, as I show that the examples of Congressional precommit-
ments—or more precisely, attempted precommitments—are appeals to the social norm of 
rule-following, i.e. the ideology of “legalism.” This ideology, as identified by Judith 
Shklar, is itself a form of overclaiming—professing the (unearned) authority of neutrality. 
Finally in Parts III and IV, I focus back on the specific recent examples which in-
spired this article, namely the example of IPAB as enacted in the Affordable Care Act and 
the sequester as enacted in the Budget Control Act of 2011. These examples show in detail 
the operation of precommitment devices by Congress and their dependence upon legalism. 
The methodology of examining particular examples is not only to illustrate the false ne-
cessity of precommitment by detailing how the measures fail to bind. The choice to look 
at particular cases also shows how individual instances of competing claims fare under 
automatic precommitment, which in turn reveals the specific and policy-laden effect of 
these purportedly general “rules” in the context of budget and spending decisions. The 
examples begin the task of illustrating the specific winners and losers under these devices. 
The interests favored turn out to be those who already enjoy conventional political power, 
while transparency, coherence, and the interest of the less empowered are disserved. The 
downside of legalism is both what we sacrifice to blind fidelity to the rule without consid-
eration for the contingencies of a particular instance, but also how creeping legalism in 
political realms functions to privilege certain values and exclude rivals. 
 
                                                        
 12. My definition of my project therefore excludes examples of Congress binding the executive branch, the 
executive branch binding Congress, the Constitution binding Congress or the executive, or the executive branch 
entering into contracts that bind itself. 
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I: THE STRUCTURE OF PRECOMMITMENT AND ITS ROLE IN SEPARATING LAW FROM 
POLITICS 
A. The Structure of Precommitment 
Neither IPAB nor the sequester is sui generis. They both belong to the class of laws 
with a “precommitment” structure. Legal scholars have recognized, applied, debated, and 
contested this structure,13 relying heavily upon thinking by Jon Elster, who began pursuing 
this line of inquiry to account for predictable irrationality14 from the standpoint of rational 
choice modeling, a project now popularly known as behavioral economics.15 Precommit-
ments represent a potential tool by which rational actors, knowing they are subject to 
flawed decision-making, might seek to correct for those predictable defects. According to 
Elster, a person engages in precommitment when he “acts at one point in time in order to 
ensure that at some later time he will perform an act that he could but would not have 
performed without that prior act.”16 
Elster utilizes several other criteria to distinguish precommitment from other related 
notions.17 One of the most notable is his requirement that for some decision at time one to 
count as a precommitment, the effect of carrying out the time one decision must be to set 
up some external constraint.18 This stipulation specifically distinguishes precommitment 
from “some mental attitude that can be described as ‘resolution,’ or ‘firmness of pur-
pose.’”19 If Ulysses simply decided at time one that he would hold steadfast in the face of 
the Sirens’ call, but did not tie himself down with ropes, nor instruct his crew to ignore his 
pleas for release, that would not count. 
B. “Legalism” in the Liberal Tradition 
In Parts II through IV, I analyze numerous Congressional precommitment examples 
                                                        
 13. Symposium, “Paying the Alligator”: Precommitment in Law, Bioethics, and Constitutions, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1729 (2003) (including the following contributors: Robert H. Frank, John Ferejohn and Lawrence Sager, 
John Robertson, Daniel Brock, Samuel Issacharoff, Sanford Levinson, William Forbath, Steven Ratner, and oth-
ers); Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 593 
(1988); Rebecca Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 519 (2008); Tim Westmoreland, Standard Error, 95 GEO. L.J. 1555 (2007); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM 
AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and 
Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633 (1991).  
 14. See UNBOUND, supra note 11, at 29–30 (identifying predictable irrationality as that owing to passions, 
collective action problems, and weakness of will).   
 15. See generally SIRENS, supra note 11; see also THOMAS SCHELLING, The Intimate Contest for Self-com-
mand, and Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-command, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 57–82 (1984); Jeremy 
Waldron, Disagreement and Precommitment, in LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). Behavioral economics iden-
tifies categories of predictable irrationality and Elster explores whether these second-order (precommitment) 
methods are available to correct for irrationalities. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Kahneman 
et. al., eds., 1982). 
 16. Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come To It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Pre-
commitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1754 (2003). 
 17. SIRENS, supra note 11, at 42–46.  
 18. Elster, supra note 16, at 1754 (stipulating that precommitment “requires an observable action, not merely 
a mental resolution. Moreover, the action must be one that creates a change in the external world that can be 
undone only (if at all) with some cost or effort”). 
 19. SIRENS, supra note 11, at 43. 
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to show that they represent legalism at work. My methodology is two-fold. First, the spe-
cific examples will show that the obligations imposed by precommitments are grounded 
in nothing else; to the extent that they motivate, it is only due to a social norm felt among 
members of Congress that rules should be followed. This norm of rule-adherence is pre-
cisely what constitutes legalism. Second, I will show that the reasons and motivations cited 
by members of Congress for such legislative efforts are characteristically legalistic justi-
fications, claiming the binding authority of pre-existing rules, distinguishing and denigrat-
ing politics, and relegating the particular details of any matter to irrelevance. 
“Legalism,” as Shklar identifies, is the elevation of rule-following to a normative 
commitment. In her account, there are any number of norms apart from rule-following that 
we could use to guide our conduct. Force,20 custom,21 act-utilitarianism,22 patrimonial au-
thority,23 sincerity,24 revealed divine intervention,25 community sentiment26 are just a few 
candidates. Legalism eschews these for what Shklar calls “the morality of rule follow-
ing.”27 The claim for privileging this method of decision, i.e. the conformance of conduct 
to rules, is the separation of law from politics, and we see how it can arise from the precepts 
of liberalism. 
Shklar explains that under liberal theory, the binding quality of rules does not di-
minish freedom. By contrast, decision by political preference amounts to the tyranny of 
particular inclinations.28 She voices the liberal viewpoint thus:   
 
[T]he rule of law is the miracle of liberalism, government without coercion. By 
coercion, [liberals like] Professor Hayek [do] not mean any exercise of power, 
but only what occurs when one man issues a direct command to others to perform 
a specific action to serve his own ends. . . . Coercion can, however, be eliminated 
if men are governed entirely by general rules which are applied impersonally and 
equally to all.29 
 
Thus does the liberal state rely for its legitimacy upon the separation of law from 
politics, the separation of the impartial rule binding all, from political action to achieve 
                                                        
 20. SHKLAR, supra note 10, at 20 (speaking of hypothetical rule by “spontaneous violence”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 50. 
 23. Id. at 21 (characterizing qadi justice). 
 24. Id. at 57. 
 25. Id. at 54 (as would be the case under theocracy). 
 26. Id. at 102. 
 27. Id. at 87. 
 28. Id. at 55 (attributing acceptance of such tyranny to some theories of pluralism).  
 29. Id. at 23. See also id. at 122. 
[A] policy of justice in this, as in many other areas, may lead to far worse social conse-
quences than a policy of semi-justice, in which several incompatible goals are allowed to 
live in compromise, even though logically they are mutually exclusive. It is not wicked-
ness that creates a multiplicity of needs and values, but the inevitable diversity among 
people and the complexity of the demands that a highly developed culture makes upon 
them. This does not diminish the value of legalistic ethics or of legal institutions. To show 
that justice has its practical and ideological limits is not to slight it.  
Id. 
7
Ho: Budgeting on Autopilot: Do Sequestration and the Independent Paym
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
HO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2015  3:20 PM 
702 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:695  
personal contingent ends.30 Liberalism typically confines rule-abidance then to the arena 
of universal agreement among equals (or derivation of a process undertaken by an author-
ity that equals can all agree upon) while leaving other areas open to coexistence if possible, 
or contest.31 The separation of law from politics, justice from expediency, then follows 
from the diversity and incompatibility of ends, as well as the possibility of social consensus 
on the rules under which we may pursue those ends.32 And the standard liberal rationale 
for why universal agreement is possible with respect to “justice” is because without such 
rules, all ends are undermined.33 Rawls formulates the useful device of the original posi-
tion and “veil of ignorance” by which one might distinguish “justice” from “politics.” 
Rules of the former sort would be adopted behind the veil by those on equal terms who do 
not know what contingent ends they may come to pursue.34 The dictates of justice and 
fairness, therefore, are distinguished as “untainted” by the danger of arbitrariness, parti-
sanship, or coercion of others with respect to ends. 
But, legalism, says Shklar—cannot stop there with the mere distinction between law 
and politics. It must claim law’s superiority to politics.35 The primacy of rules over every 
other value or inclination cannot admit of competing considerations.  
The importance of rules in a liberal system preoccupied with the fear of arbitrariness 
and partiality, is that by following them, competing choices are concealed such that “de-
cisions seem to be not choices but accepted necessities.”36 Legalism, according to Shklar, 
is an ideology that masks disagreement. Though it presupposes agreement, it unfortunately 
cannot generate it. Indeed, Shklar speculates that legalism “may in practice make people 
especially uncompromising for it has nothing to say about incompatible systems of rules 
save that one set must be binding.”37 Amid discord, legalism “imposes a unity”38 and “the 
type of agreement demanded is adherence to certain universally valid rules that are ‘there’ 
for all the rational to see.”39 
Acknowledging any countervailing views reduces the demands of legalism to arbi-
trariness as well. A society absent such agreement would “leave the question of the scope 
                                                        
 30. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 451 (1971) (“[I]n justice as fairness the concepts of the right and 
the good have markedly distinct features. These differences arise from the structure of contract theory and the 
priority of right and justice that results.”).  
 31. Id. at 356–91 (discussing abidance by the rule of the majority and the role of civil disobedience and 
conscientious refusal). JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH GENEVA MANUSCRIPT AND 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 77 (Roger Masters ed., Judith Masters trans., 1978) (observing that civil laws arise to 
govern “the . . . relation of the members to each other or to the entire body, and this relationship should be as 
small as possible with respect to the former and as large as possible with respect to the latter, so that each citizen 
is in a position of perfect independence from all others”). 
 32. RAWLS, supra note 30, at 126, 447. 
 33. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189–91 (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1968). See also RAWLS, supra note 30, at 
269 (“This is simply the general case of the prisoner’s dilemma of which Hobbes’ state of nature is the classical 
example.”). 
 34. HOBBES, supra note 33, at 126–30, 136–42, 251–57. 
 35. See SHKLAR, supra note 10, at 122. 
 36. Id. at 11. 
 37. Id. at 104. 
 38. Id. at 123. 
 39. Id. at 63. 
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of law, the question of what should and what should not be enforced, in an exposed posi-
tion as an open question of political preference.”40 And for legalism, political preference 
could never be deemed adequate to the task of drawing such boundaries. To preserve the 
utility and function of rules, whose special feature is their impartiality, politics, Shklar 
says, must ever be characterized in derogatory terms: 
 
Direct bargaining, for instance, is often treated as a matter of disreputa-
ble expediency, a sort of ideological anarchy, hardly to be distinguished 
from uncontrolled physical violence. . . Thus to maintain the contrast 
between legal order and political chaos and to preserve the former from 
any taint of the latter it is not just necessary to define law out of politics; 
an entirely extravagant image of politics as essentially a species of war 
has to be maintained. Only thus can the sanctity of rule-following as a 
social policy be kept from compromising associations.41 
 
This invidious separation of “politics” from “law” is pervasive throughout our dis-
course and our institutions, separating the legislative from the judicial and the substantive 
from the procedural. Budgetary decisions, guns-or-butter choices, have been convention-
ally placed squarely on the “politics” side of this divide, an expression of contingent pref-
erence rather than universal agreement.42 My argument here is that the aggressive use of 
precommitment devices in guns-or-butter decisions will prove to depend on an ideology 
of legalism, on a normative belief that a “better” way to make decisions is by following 
pre-existing rules. The telltale signs of legalism will include efforts to anoint rules as bind-
ing and pre-existing, to elevate such rules above “politics,” and a suppression of the par-
ticularities of any issue. Such maneuvers in political budget fights should arouse our keen 
scrutiny. The invasion of legalism into the budgeting realm ironically undermines the lib-
eral distinctions upon which it relies, blurring the boundary between law and politics. 
The liberal tradition obviously supplies fertile ground for legalism’s growth. What 
Shklar’s articulation of legalism contributes is the ability to regard legalism as distinct 
from liberalism, and thereby recognize and describe it as it colonizes arenas of life that are 
not necessarily juridical.43 Shklar herself identified political trials, such as those in Nurem-
berg, as an example of such colonization.44 More recently, Robin West has used Shklar’s 
                                                        
 40. Id. at 63. 
 41. Id. at 122. 
 42. RAWLS, supra note 30, at 283 (characterizing the functions of budgeting, such as budgeting for public 
goods as follows: “The basis of this scheme is the benefit principle and not the principles of justice”); ROUSSEAU, 
supra note 31, at 75–76 (stating that “these general objects . . . [of legislation] should be modified in each country 
according to the relationships that arise as much from the local situation as from the character of its inhabitants.” 
These questions are for him “matters of expediency.”). However, justice also sets outer boundaries for allocative 
decisions. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 348–52 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (stressing the 
protection of property against legislatures). Rawls also proposes the difference principle as a limit justice places 
upon distributive decisions, see RAWLS, supra note 30, at 258–64. 
 43. The language and imagery of “colonization” and “juridification” of areas of life previously free from such 
rationalities borrows from 2 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, LIFEWORLD AND 
SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 360–73 (Thomas McCarthy, trans, 1987). 
 44. See Robin West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 119, 120 (2003). 
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work to describe the “legalistic” cast of the arguments for military action in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan.45 Zephyr Teachout writes of the “legalistic” culture of the Occupy movement.46 
The incursion of legalism into these arenas bespeaks legalism’s “inability to recognize its 
own social functions, both in their greatness and in their limitations.”47 Shklar’s work sug-
gests a pathway for considering how legalism, while still valuable in characteristically 
juristic practices and institutions, can stray beyond its purview in a way that is blind to the 
legitimacy of alternate modes.48 
Moreover, Shklar’s work explains how legalism operates to undermine the law-pol-
itics distinction upon which it relies. She says her “entire aim is rather to account for the 
difficulties which the morality of justice faces in a morally pluralistic world and to help it 
recognize its real place in it—not above the political world but in its very midst.”49 This 
makes Shklar a useful guide in this article’s project, to show that rule following obtains in 
certain arenas not by legal necessity but as a social and political norm. It is one weapon, 
like any other in the political arena, but not a trump over other political considerations. 
C. The Context of Legal Scholarship 
Legal scholars, in considering legislation and statutory interpretation, have recog-
nized the proliferation of precommitment devices and analyzed them under other names, 
such as entrenchment, statutized rules, framework legislation,50 or recusal legislation.51 All 
are subsets of the class of precommitment devices. 
I pause to specify legislative entrenchment, one subset of Congressional precommit-
ment in particular, because my conclusions run directly contrary to those of legislative 
entrenchment’s most vocal proponents, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule. Posner and 
                                                        
 45. SHKLAR, supra note 10, at 112.  
 46. Zephyr Teachout, Legalism and Devolution of Power in the Public Sphere: Reflections on Occupy Wall 
Street, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1867 (2012). 
 47. SHKLAR, supra note 10, at 112; Teachout, supra note 46. 
 48. West, supra note 44, at 119–20 (“[L]egalism can be found in a ‘more or less’ state in a wide range of 
political, social, and cultural institutions and practices, and not just in those institutions dubbed ‘legal.’ Therefore, 
barriers generally drawn by professional legal philosophers between ‘jurisprudence’ and political and moral phi-
losophy are artificial and unjustified.”).  
 49. SHKLAR, supra note 10, at 123. 
 50. Elizabeth Garrett and others have looked at Congress’s efforts to calibrate the level of difficulty of future 
choices through a specific method—the modification of Congressional rules. Garrett dubs these efforts “frame-
work legislation,” which she says are laws that “establish internal procedures that will shape legislative deliber-
ation and voting on certain decisions in the future. They are laws about the congressional lawmaking process 
itself.” Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1496, 1531 
(2008). Aaron Andrew-Bruhl uses the term “statutized rules,” and Garrett identifies how her notion of framework 
legislation, while clearly broader than “entrenchment,” as it would include fast-track trade legislation, is narrower 
than statutized rules insofar as she is only looking at statutes that change the rules for a specific set of decisions. 
Id. at 1497 & n.11. The term “statutized rules,” on the other hand, refers to any statute that addresses the con-
gressional lawmaking process even without delimiting the specific set of decisions subject to that process. Aaron 
Andrew-Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers and the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 346 (2003). Bruhl considers his notion of “statutized rules” to be like 
legislative entrenchment because both aim to change the relative burdens of certain subsequent Congressional 
acts from what they would have been otherwise. Id. at 372–73. 
 51. Michael J. Teter, Recusal Legislating: Congress’s Answer to Institutional Stalemate, 48 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 1, 8–12 (2011). 
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Vermeule, among others, have examined entrenchment,52 and they define entrenchment as 
follows: 
 
[W]e mean the enactment of either statutes or internal legislative rules 
that are binding against subsequent legislative action in the same form 
. . . . On our definition, an ordinary law has some propositional content 
P—no bicycles in the park, for example. An entrenching statute has this 
propositional content plus an additional provision R which governs the 
conditions under which the statute may be repealed or amended. For ex-
ample, R might say that P cannot be repealed or amended with less than 
a two-thirds majority in both the House and the Senate.53 
 
Thus, entrenchment affects the degree of difficulty with which some set of decisions in the 
future can be made, and is thereby a precommitment, i.e. a modification of the likelihood 
that some choice will be made in the future. The reason I elect to use the term precommit-
ment rather than entrenchment throughout the piece is that entrenchment is defined quite 
narrowly insofar as the legislative action must be “binding against subsequent legislative 
action in the same form.”54 Under such a narrow definition, even fast-track legislation and 
budget legislation would fall outside the scope of our inquiry. While these statutes argua-
bly alter the mode by which each chamber’s rules may be changed from internal resolution 
by each house to statutory means requiring bicameralism and presentment, these statutes 
do not make their own amendment more difficult. The statutes can be amended by merely 
passing a contrary or amending statute.55 Therefore, subsequent legislative action “in the 
same form” is not affected. However, this level of formal rigor seems too restrictive for 
my purposes. Fast-track and other procedurally privileging statutes can still be usefully 
understood as Congress intentionally aiming to change the relative burden of certain sub-
sequent Congressional acts from what they would have faced otherwise. They still qualify 
as deliberate attempts to adjust the difficulty of making certain choices at time two. 
II: PRECOMMITMENT EXAMPLES: THREE METHODS, THREE CASE STUDIES 
To further illustrate what the label “Congressional precommitment” encompasses, I 
have gathered examples, showing along the way both their weaknesses in fending off 
changes of heart at time two, and their dependence upon legalism. The three principal tools 
I discuss are supermajority requirements, statutized rules like those pertaining to fast-track 
legislation, and “notwithstanding” clauses. These are not mutually exclusive categories. 
Indeed many statutized rules are protected by notwithstanding clauses or supermajority 
points of order, and some supermajority requirements are codified as statutized rules. 
Moreover, many examples of ostensible Congressional precommitment employ multiple 
                                                        
 52. Amandeep S. Grewal, Legislative Entrenchment Rules in the Tax Law, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1011, 1022 & 
n.60 (2010).  
 53. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1667. 
 54. Id. (emphasis added).  
 55. Indeed with the disclaimer language that Congress usually passes along with any statutized rule, such 
mechanisms do not even make their own amendment by “a different (and presumably less weighty) form of 
enactment—in this case, internal resolutions of one chamber,” more difficult. Bruhl, supra note 50, at 376–77. 
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precommitment tools at once. Three important case studies, each of which display more 
than one of the three methods, are the Congressional budgeting framework, recusal dele-
gation, and entitlements. These cases are crucial for understanding the genealogy and char-
acteristics of sequestration and IPAB, and I look at each of these in greater depth through 
the examples below. 
A. Supermajority 
We have referred to supermajority requirements for certain congressional actions. 
Though it is technically a Senate precommitment, not a Congressional precommitment per 
se, one of the most well-known is Rule XXII in the Senate, the “filibuster.” This rule not 
only requires three-fifths of the Senate to invoke cloture (ending Senate floor debate on a 
bill), but also demands that any changes to the Senate rules, including the rules on cloture, 
achieve two-thirds support.56 Nearly all Senate action has been made more difficult by 
virtue of this precommitment.57 Moreover, an even greater supermajority requirement at 
time two, a requirement of two-thirds of those present and voting, burdens the particular 
act of changing the cloture rule.58 
While cloture rules apply more-or-less generally across a number of topical areas, 
sometimes supermajority requirements have been proposed that burden legislative activity 
of a more specific type. As part of the Republican Revolution of the mid-1990’s, when the 
GOP exploited the political fall-out from the Clinton health reform efforts to reclaim a 
majority in the House after four decades in the minority, newly elected House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich championed the so-called “Contract with America.”59 This platform, de-
signed to evoke the aura of legitimacy surrounding the social contract, included a plank 
subjecting tax increases to a three-fifths majority vote in the House.60 
1. Obstacles to Supermajority Entrenchment 
By virtually universal acclamation, legislatures face grave doctrinal obstacles enlist-
ing courts to help them bind their successors.61 The classic cases cited include Newton v. 
Commissioners, in which the Supreme Court struck as unconstitutional a state legislature’s 
attempts to “permanently establish” the town of Canfield as the county seat of Mahoning 
County in Ohio.”62 In Reichelderfer v. Quinn, the Court interpreted a statute that “perpet-
                                                        
 56. See, e.g., Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and Pro-
cedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 207, 212 (2004). 
 57. Although some acts, such as the budget resolution, or reconciliation, are subject to limited debate.  
 58. OLESZEK, supra note 3, at 241. 
 59. Jennifer Harper, When the GOP ‘loudy and proudly’ spoke up: The Contract with America turns 20, 
WASH. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/25/two-decades-later-con-
tract-america-turn-20/. 
 60. Bruce Ackerman, An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539 (1995); see Skaggs v. 
Carle, 110 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 61. John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors 
Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1776 (2003) (referring to the “virtually unanimous [rejection by] . 
. . everyone who has ever thought or written about the issue” of “the idea that one legislature, through ordinary 
legislation, should be allowed to bind future legislatures”). 
 62. Newton v. Comm’rs, 100 U.S. 548, 553 (1879). 
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ually dedicated” certain lands for Rock Creek Park, to achieve less than a “perpetual” ef-
fect in order to avoid constitutional problems.63 
Most have understood this anti-entrenchment principle to apply to procedural en-
trenchment statutes as well, i.e. statutes that entrench not by using the words “permanent” 
or “perpetual” to ward off future legislative change, but by requiring a procedural hurdle 
such as a supermajority for Congressional action of that type. Even the most vigorous 
defenders of the permissibility of such entrenching statutes do not advocate for courts to 
enforce those entrenchments in the face of a contrary later-enacted statute.64 Posner and 
Vermeule, while arguing in favor of the constitutionality of entrenchment, conspicuously 
“take no position . . . on whether courts should enforce entrench[ing] statutes when subse-
quent legislatures violate the entrenchment by enacting a contrary statute.”65 In discussing 
the Gingrich House’s supermajority rule for tax increases, McGinnis and Rappaport not 
only conclude that this rule is subject to repeal by simple majority, but that to make it 
otherwise would be unconstitutional.66 They then consider the example of an insulated 
supermajority rule,67 which protects a supermajority requirement from being changed or 
repealed by Congress except by supermajority.68 They argue against permitting such de-
vices based on the historical precept of the equality of legislatures, and on the structural 
circumstance that permitting entrenchment of this type allows legislatures to effectively 
amend the Constitution in ways other than prescribed under Article V.69 
Even the filibuster is vulnerable. Some opine that the Senate is a continuing body, 
based on the feature that no more than one-third of the Senators are up for re-election at 
any given time.70 Accordingly, the Senate rules persist until changed,71 which under the 
Senate rules themselves, requires a two-thirds majority.72 The House, by contrast, adopts 
                                                        
 63. Reicheldferfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 317–18 (1932). A seminal academic article defending the anti-
entrenchment rule is Julian Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 
1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379. 
 64. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1670. 
 65. Id. (explaining that “[o]ur argument is simply that the subsequent legislature is bound by the entrench-
ment”). 
 66. See John McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Require-
ments: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 500 (1995). 
 67. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1669 (calling this the solution by “self-reference.”); see McGinnis 
& Rappaport, supra note 66. McGinnis and Rappaport provide the following hypothesis:  
that, instead of passing a three-fifths rule that a majority could repeal, the House had 
passed the three-fifths rule and a special repeal rule that required a supermajority vote to 
repeal the three-fifths rule. . . [A] majority could simply pass resolutions that repealed the 
repeal rule and the three-fifths rule. . . . To prevent this maneuver, the House might . . . 
pass . . . the insulated repeal rule—providing that both it (the insulated repeal rule) and the 
three-fifths rule could only be repealed by a supermajority vote. We believe, however that 
the Constitution does not allow such an insulated repeal rule to be given effect. 
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 66, at 503–04. 
 68. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 66, at 503–04. 
 69. Id. at 505–07 (regarding the filibuster, declaring, “Here we can state with some confidence only that when 
a house votes, the Constitution requires that a majority be able to repeal an existing rule.” However, they allow 
that a supermajority can be required for bringing something to a vote). 
 70. United States Senate Overview, ALLGOV.COM, http://www.allgov.com/departments/legislative-
branch/united-states-senate?agencyid=7433# (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
 71. S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 113th Cong., Standing Rules of the S. Rule V (2013) [hereinafter Senate 
Rules]. 
 72. Senate Rules, XXII. 
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a new set of House rules at the beginning of each Congress, requiring only a majority for 
passage.73 However, others contend that nothing bars the Senate from similarly adopting 
new rules at the beginning of each Congress, or indeed at any time, and that this adoption 
is not constrained by the two-thirds requirement for changing the continuing rules. This 
view has been called the nuclear option and has recently been used by Senate Majority 
Leader Harry Reid to exempt confirmation of most presidential appointees from potential 
filibuster.74 
A former aide to Senate Majority Leaders William Frist and Howard Baker has out-
lined several additional ways the Senate can change the cloture rule by simple majority.75 
For instance, such a change could be achieved by setting a precedent altering the Senate’s 
procedures governing debate, which would only require a simple majority.76 Moreover, a 
Standing Order, which needs only a majority, could modify the Senate’s procedures, as 
“Standing Orders are not incorporated into the text of the Standing Rules, but nonetheless 
bind the Senate.”77 Indeed, in 2000, a majority vote instituted a Standing Order that pre-
vented Senators from asking for the reading of conference reports, a tactic that had been 
used to delay business.78  
Furthermore, Congress itself has exempted certain legislation, such as reconcilia-
tion, fast-track, or other must-pass bills from the filibuster through ordinary legislation, a 
phenomenon I discuss further in Part II.B. 
2. Supermajority Requirements as Legalism 
Each attempt to impose supermajority requirements tries to assimilate the process of 
deciding among political values to mere rule-abidance. Under such regimes, political out-
comes can be blamed on the filibuster, rather than Congress’ substantive opposition. “The 
defeat of the bill, despite majority support” is common parlance in press statements on 
Senate outcomes.79 This formulation then allows members of the Senate to deflect ac-
countability by portraying the result as determined by a “rule,” rather than by the political 
preferences of Senators.80 
                                                        
 73. Wm. Holmes Brown, Charles W. Johnson, & John V. Sullivan, House Practice A Guide to the Rules, 
Precedents, and Procedures of the House, GPO.GOV 837-38, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-HPRACTICE-
112/pdf/GPO-HPRACTICE-112.pdf (last visited March 16, 2015). 
 74. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats trigger ‘nuclear’ option; eliminate most filibusters on nominees, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-
vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html.  
 75. See Gold & Gupta, supra note 56, at 208. 
 76. Id. at 209. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Despite Majority Support, Republicans Block Cantwell Effort to Help Families Heat their 
Homes this Winter, SENATE.GOV (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.cantwell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-re-
leases?ID=edee3e15-c307-426c-96e2-addac8aa9a63. See also Steve Benen, GOP Kills Jobs Bill Despite Major-
ity Support, WASH. MONTHLY (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-ani-
mal/2011_10/gop_kills_jobs_bill_despite_ma032756.php.   
 80. BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LEGISLATION (4th ed. 2011). 
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B. Statutized Rules: Privileging Procedures (Fast-Track) 
In some sense, privileged procedural status is the mirror image of a supermajority 
requirement. Rather than procedurally encumbering a particular set of actions, it greases 
the procedural wheels by disabling the filibuster through debate limits, by prohibiting 
amendments or other delaying motions, and by setting deadlines for Congressional action. 
Congress’ so-called “fast-track” authority on trade agreements falls in this category.81 As 
Aaron Andrew-Bruhl stated, “[u]nder fast track rules, Congress is required to schedule a 
vote within two months, and neither chamber may amend the president’s implementing 
bill. Fast track thus guarantees the president (and trade partners) a speedy up-or-down 
decision on the nation’s participation in a free trade agreement.”82 
The passage of statutes setting such internal rules could, by implication, suggest that 
procedures codified in statute can only be modified by statute, thereby requiring bicameral 
passage and presentment. But this state of affairs has been understood to exist, if not in 
conflict, then at least in tension with the Constitution’s Rules of Proceedings clause, under 
which “[e]ach house may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”83 Therefore to clarify 
that such statutized rules could still be changed by one house, Congress includes in any 
such bill the following boilerplate language, stating that the statutized rule was enacted: 
 
[A]s an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate, respectively, and as such. . .[is] deemed a part of 
the rules of each House, respectively . . . and . . . supersede[s] other rules 
only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and with full 
recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules 
(so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the 
same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of 
that House.84 
 
This language was included by the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission 
(BRAC) and part of that act’s institutional division-of-labor that the Supreme Court de-
clined to actively supervise in Dalton v. Specter.85 
The BRAC law, like IPAB, also sought to enable cuts in a situation where spending 
was plagued by collective action problems. In the decade leading up to BRAC, the gov-
ernment was unable to close a single military base, despite consensus that the military had 
many more bases than could be justified.86 Because each base brought economic benefits 
to the community in which it resided, each individual legislator would always oppose the 
                                                        
 81. Bruhl, supra note 50. 
 82. Id. at 345. See also 19 U.S.C. § 2191. 
 83. U.S. CONST. art 1, §. 5, cl. 2. 
 84. Bruhl, supra note 50, at 364.  
 85. Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (BRAC), § 2908(f), 
Pub. L. No. 100–526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988) [hereinafter BRAC]; see Dalton v. Spector, 511 U.S. 462 (1994) 
(adopting a posture of judicial non-interference with the allocation of roles effected by BRAC). 
 86. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717 
(2004). 
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closure of her district’s base, even if all legislators agreed on the general need for some 
bases to be closed. Therefore in 1988, Congress passed BRAC, which established a com-
mission of experts who, within the framework of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 
strategic plan, would identify a list of bases to be closed based on set criteria, such as 
military need.87 Those closures would take effect unless Congress passed a joint resolution 
of disapproval. This device presumably changed Congress’ options at time two, because 
the joint resolution of disapproval was procedurally protected by statutized rules of pro-
ceeding, and could not be amended.88 That is, if Congress wished to reject the Commis-
sion’s base closure list, the joint resolution, presumed to be the only available option, 
would permit the rejection of the whole list, but not the modification of any portion. 
1. Congress’ Statutized Rules Fail to Bind 
However, courts eschew judicial intervention against Congress as it carries out its 
internal procedures.89 First of all, judges policing Congress’ deviation from statutized rules 
would confront the obstacle of the boilerplate disclaimer language immunizing such 
measures against questions based on the Rulemaking Clause.90 
When Congress tries to establish procedures regularizing its own activities, it often 
finds itself in the position of author, arbiter, interpreter, and enforcer. In Marshall Field & 
Co. v. Clark (Marshall Field), the Supreme Court held that Congress judges what counts 
as an enrolled bill and how much legislative journal-keeping to undertake.91 In this case, 
some private plaintiffs alleged that the enrolled bill presented to the President differed 
from the provision passed by the Congress.92 The Court, inaugurating what would be 
termed the “enrolled bill doctrine,” ruled that it would not second-guess Congress on this 
matter. Rather than a statutized rule, Marshall Field concerned an internal legislative rule 
and practice about presiding officers attesting to whether the bill presented to the President 
was in fact the same as the bill passed by the Senate. However, the implication of Marshall 
Field is that if Congress were to change its internal rules and practices to conflict with an 
earlier statutized rule, especially one with a disclaimer, Congress’ use of that later practice 
would be difficult to challenge in court.93 
Other collateral doctrines also function to deprive Congress of an “enforcement 
                                                        
 87. BRAC, supra note 85, §§ 201–03, 2901(a), 2902(c), 2903(b); 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1994); see also BRAC, 
supra note 85, at §§ 203(a) & 206 (identifying military need as the principal criterion).  
 88. BRAC, supra note 85, § 2908(d). 
 89. See Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. 
L. REV. 1253, 1274–79, 1298-1301 (2000). U.S. CONST., art I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules 
of its Proceedings.”); Kysar, supra note 13, at 559. 
 90. Bruhl, supra note 50, at 369 (finding only a few statutes that fail to include the disclaimer). 
 91. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). Decided the same day, U.S. v. Ballin 144 U.S. 1 
(1892), also relied on the Rulemaking Clause to protect from outside scrutiny Congress’ ability to set and judge 
its own interpretation of the requisite quorum, as long as no other provision of the constitution or aspect of a 
third-party’s personal fundamental liberties were violated. 
 92. Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 672–73. 
 93. Marshall Field remains good law today. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (up-
holding Marshall Field). 
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mechanism outside of congressional will” for these procedural precommitments.94 For in-
stance, the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act95 gave the president authority to rec-
ommend waiver of regulatory requirements that might impede a natural gas pipeline pro-
ject, and it imposed a statutized rule that Congress consider such a recommendation 
through a particular type of procedurally streamlined resolution.96 But such resolution re-
lating to the same recommendation could not be considered twice within the same sixty-
day period. Congress waived this once-in-sixty-day rule and then-Senator Metzenbaum 
sued. However, courts would not address the violation, claiming political question.97 This 
case confirms that the courts’ reluctance to interfere in Congress’ internal procedures ex-
tends to instances where such procedures contravene a previously enacted statutized rule. 
The general passivity of the courts is punctuated by a few exceptions. Courts will 
venture in if the congressional action with respect to a rule is arguably not internal, because 
it “affect[s] persons other than congressional members.”98 In United States v. Smith, the 
Senate rule required that the President take particular action, i.e. return a resolution, in 
order for the Senate to reconsider a nomination.99 The Court enforced this rule because a 
third-party’s eligibility for a particular office was at stake.100 
Nevertheless, courts have declined to enter the fray in many other instances when 
non-legislators’ rights, even Constitutional rights, were at stake.101 Observers have con-
cluded from this history that “legislative rules rely wholly upon internal enforcement by 
Congress.”102 
C. “Notwithstanding Clauses” (Statutized Rules of Construction) 
I next consider “notwithstanding clauses” under the precommitment rubric. Others 
have called these “statutized rules of construction,” or “Mother-May-I” clauses, and the 
clauses claim to control the effect of subsequent laws.103 These clauses purport to apply 
                                                        
 94. Kysar, supra note 13, at 553. 
 95. Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976, Pub L. No. 94–586, 90 Stat. 2903 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 719g). 
 96. Id. § 719f(d)(5)(B). 
 97. Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1284–88 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see Bruhl, supra note 50, at 369 n.102; 
see also United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1305–06, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 98. Kysar, supra note 13, at 555. 
 99. United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932).  
 100. In Smith, the third party was seeking appointment to the Federal Power Commission. The Senate pro-
ceeded, even without the President’s return of the resolution, to reconsider and reject the nomination. Smith, 286 
U.S. 6. See also Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963) (enforcing Congressional rules that conferred rights 
upon witnesses whose testimony was being compelled by a Congressional committee  and justifying interference 
because in questions where the Constitution or fundamental personal rights were at stake, the courts reserve the 
power to step in). See also Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949) (allowing the defendant to question 
the quorum of a constitutional committee before which his testimony was adjudged perjury).  
 101. See Exxon v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (barring plaintiffs from obtaining court relief interfering 
with Congress’ manner of exercising its subpoena authority even if that manner threatened the confidentiality of 
its trade secrets); see also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) (defendant raising lack of quorum as an 
affirmative defense for her failure to produce records in response to a House Committee on Un-American Activ-
ities subpoena, and the Court dismissing the claim). 
 102. Kysar, supra note 13, at 526.  
 103. See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
2085, 2117–19 (2002); see also Grewal, supra note 52. 
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“notwithstanding” any other or subsequent provision of law, or “without regard” to those 
other laws, ostensibly brushing them aside to give effect to only those laws meeting the 
conditions specified in the instant clause. For the purposes of considering these clauses as 
precommitment devices, we attend only to the effect of these clauses on subsequent law. 
Some examples of such clauses supply a default definition, as in the Dictionary 
Act,104 and others stipulate certain canons of interpretation.105  Professor Lawrence Tribe, 
in considering the “notwithstanding clause” of Section 6 of the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which purports to apply RFRA to any future law “unless such 
law explicitly excludes such application,”106 concludes that the problem with enforcing 
such a law is that it “would in a sense permit an earlier Congress to add to Article I’s 
requirements for the enactment of laws by a later Congress.”107 Do these constitute pre-
commitments to the extent that they apply to and govern the interpretation or effect of 
subsequent laws? Tribe argues that at least some are impermissible entrenchments. How-
ever, Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz contends that they do not entrench108 because these 
rules “[themselves] may be suspended or repealed by an act that comports with Article I, 
Section 7.”109 
Amandeep Grewal has called some of these clauses “Mother-May-I” laws. These 
laws on their face require Congress to jump through hoops in order to take future action 
of a particular kind. These hoops consist of specific statements, or placement within or 
invocations of some particular subsection of the code.110 Examples include Section 
501(c)(1) of the tax code which declares that tax exemptions for federal instrumentalities 
cannot simply be enacted anywhere, at anytime.111 Only the exemptions in the same title 
501(c) will be effective, because the language stipulates that the tax must be applied “with-
out regard to any provision of law which is not contained in this title and which is not 
contained in a revenue Act.”112 Statutized rules of construction purport to apply to later 
laws as well, aiming to establish a different effect or different construction “notwithstand-
ing” other background rules. These altered rules of construction usually provide for their 
own application unless Congress includes some particular statement or invocation. As I 
discuss later, the IPAB law’s ban against repealing certain of its features in any way other 
than through a limited type of joint resolution falls within this category. 
 
                                                        
 104. 1 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.  
 105. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–66, 105 Stat. 1071 (stating that “[n]o statements 
other than the interpretive memorandum . . . shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way 
as legislative history of [certain provisions] of this Act”). Although this section applies to contemporaneous law 
and does not specifically claim to apply as against “subsequently” passed provisions of law, it represents a clear 
example of Congress trying to change the underlying conditions under which its legislation is interpreted by 
courts. 
 106. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–41, 107 Stat. 1488. 
 107. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 125–26 (3d ed. 2000) 
 108. Though they may still be intended as precommitments. 
 109. Rosenkranz, supra note 103, at 2118. 
 110. Grewal, supra note 52 (usefully grouping various examples into categories). 
 111. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(1) (2014). 
 112. Id.  
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1. The Doubtful Effect of Statutized Rules of Construction on Later-In-Time 
Statutes 
Once again, we find that distinguishing the effect of these provisions from that of 
ordinary legislation becomes difficult. Certainly Congress can change its mind at time two 
and repeal the clause through ordinary means. Thus, statutized rules of construction are no 
more binding than supermajority requirements or statutized rules of proceedings like fast-
track. But even short of that, these clauses are often defeated by implied repeals or last-in-
time doctrines.113 The implied repeals doctrine construes a subsequent statute as repealing 
an earlier statute if the two are in irreconcilable conflict.114 This principle is congruent with 
the “last-in-time rule,”115 which provides that if there is no way to give effect to two stat-
utory provisions, then the last-in-time will be favored.116 Under this doctrine, these “not-
withstanding” statutes do not have force against Congress’ clear attempts to override, and 
must often cede even in the face of Congress’ later implied decisions to override. 
Posner and Vermeule mount the most aggressive defense of these “notwithstanding” 
devices as effective self-entrenchment, changing the degree of difficulty of Congress’ ac-
tions at a future time. They concede that “[t]hese provisions are not wholly entrenched, 
because they could be repealed by a simple majority.”117 However, they contend that “un-
like an ordinary statute they could not be repealed by a simple majority acting by implica-
tion.”118 There are a number of responses to Posner and Vermeule. Posner and Vermeule 
seem to suggest119 that the permissibility of these notwithstanding laws is less than clear, 
as there may be separation of powers concerns with taking these rules of interpretation out 
of the hands of courts and putting them into the hands of legislators.120 Moreover, repeal-
by-implication does not always constitute the background rule, since there are often pre-
sumptions against such repeal.121 It is not clear that the difficulty of Congress’ future im-
plied repeals is thus appreciably changed. All of this must further be understood in the 
context of Posner and Vermeule’s stance that their support for such self-entrenchment does 
not mean they believe such provisions should be judicially enforced, a position about 
                                                        
 113. This discussion of “statutory rules of statutory interpretation” does not speak to the implications when 
these types of clauses are enforced against prior-passed law or contemporaneous law, but only when they purport 
to apply to subsequent law. See Abbe Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the 
Age of Statutes, 54 WILLIAM &  MARY L. REV. 753, 801–04 (2013) (citing cases where courts relied upon savings 
clauses to decide effect on contemporaneous law, but also noting that jurists and scholars have exhibited re-
sistance to legislated interpretive rules even in that context).  
 114. Grewal, supra note 52, at 1040, 1048 (citing Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 
2006) (per curiam) (proposing that if Congress’ later enacted statute is flatly inconsistent with earlier enactment, 
the prior legislatures are overridden).  
 115. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1668. 
 116. Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (noting that in the event of conflict between earlier 
and later statutes, “the last expression of the sovereign will must control”). 
 117. Posner & Verneule, supra note 8, at 1698.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1698–99. 
 120. Though Rosenkranz argues that this statement cannot be presumed as a general matter, but may need a 
more nuanced approach taking into account the circumstances of each individual instance. See Rosenkranz, supra 
note 103, at 2103–09. 
 121. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974) (declaring that “‘repeals by implication are not favored,’” 
(quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)). 
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which some have remarked “as a practical matter, is often equivalent to a position that 
rejects entrenchment.”122 
Indeed, it strains credulity to characterize existing case law as recognizing “Mother-
May-I” or “notwithstanding” requirements. For instance, the Supreme Court has held the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) Section 559 requirement—that any subsequent 
statute may supersede the APA’s requirements only if it does so expressly—does not re-
quire “magical passwords.”123 Thus the Immigration and Naturalization Act’s detailed pro-
cedures for deportation hearings, which purported to be the sole and exclusive procedures 
for those hearings, could displace the APA hearing provisions, despite the lack of express 
reference to the APA.124 
In sum, these interpretive clauses may be directly repealed by ordinary legislation 
of a future Congress, and courts often do not give effect to them, even against Congress’ 
implied later repeals. 
D. Case Study 1: Budgeting 
Congress’ budget process, as Garrett and others have documented, is a deep reser-
voir of precommitment examples.125 The process simultaneously employs many of the dif-
ferent precommitment strategies catalogued here, including elaborate statutized rules such 
as points of order to procedurally privilege the budget resolution, the appropriations bills 
and reconciliation measures from certain maneuvers, as well as supermajority require-
ments to overcome those points of order. 
A fundamental concept structuring Congress’ budgeting work is the distinction be-
tween authorizing and appropriating. As Olesczek explains, “[a]uthorizations establish, 
continue or modify programs or policies; appropriations fund authorized programs and 
policies.”126 This distinction is a creature of House and Senate rules devised in the 1800’s 
which bar unauthorized appropriations.127 It parallels the distinction between legislating 
and implementing, between politics and law, and accordingly frowns upon the disposition 
of “matters of policy” in appropriations vehicles. 
The distinction continues to be delineated in many ways, including the separation of 
the appropriations from the authorizing committees, as well continued application of the 
House rule that imposes a point of order on authorizing language on an appropriations 
bill.128 This House rule is matched by Senate Rule XVI that disallows authorizing legisla-
tion on an appropriations bill as non-germane, although the rule provides for an exception 
                                                        
 122. Stewart Sterk, Retrenchment on Entrenchment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 231, 233 (2003). 
 123. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) (upholding Congress’ modification of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 
U.S. 33 (1950) that the APA governed deportation hearings). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Garrett, supra note 86. 
 126. OLESZEK, supra note 3, at 42. 
 127. Senate Rule XVI. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 15 (3d ed. 
2007); see also id. at 49 (identifying the “House Rule in 1837 requiring authorization bills to precede appropria-
tions”) (citing ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 425–26 (1935). 
 128. But see OLESZEK, supra note 3, at 122 (observing that sometimes the Rules Committee can waive points 
of order enforcing the principle against unauthorized appropriations or legislative provisions in general appro-
priations bills). 
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if such legislation is germane to the House-passed bill.129 But as with many other norms, 
this one is often honored in the breach. Appropriations riders, enacting policy by specifi-
cally instructing funds to be used or not used in certain ways, have come to be permitted 
on the Senate side. This practice has arisen because “[t]he authorization-appropriations 
rules, like almost all congressional rules, are not self-enforcing. Either chamber can choose 
to waive, ignore, or circumvent them, or establish precedents and practices that obviate 
distinctions between the two.”130 Under Clause 4 of Senate Rule XVI, questions of ger-
maneness are not necessarily submitted to the chair for ruling, but instead are sent to the 
whole Senate for an up-or-down vote by majority without debate.131 Thus the germaneness 
requirement is easily overcome as long as the underlying authorization has majority sup-
port. And even such a permissive procedure has not been routinely followed or invoked.132 
To avoid endless clogging of the appropriations process, Senate leadership now routinely 
heads off the many potentially non-germane “authorizing” amendments in other ways. 
Appropriations bills commonly bypass the Senate floor and instead are incorporated with 
other already-passed appropriations bills into omnibus conference reports before bringing 
them to a full Senate vote. This strategy benefits the bill managers because conference 
reports are protected against amendments.133 
The budget process affects both authorization and appropriations. The process starts 
each year with a Presidential budget proposal submitted to Congress by the first Monday 
in February.134 Congress then aims to adopt the budget as a concurrent resolution, which 
requires bicameral passage—but no presentment—by April 15. It often considers, but can 
depart from the President’s request. The resolution functions each year to set binding ag-
gregate annual targets for budget authority, outlays, deficits, surpluses, revenues, and al-
location among the various functional categories. It sets the parameters for Congressional 
action in that year. If the budget contemplates new legislation, the amounts it assumes are 
then binding upon the various authorizing committees such that their legislation must con-
form to the allotments or draw a point of order. If the budget contemplates action necessary 
to raise revenue or change entitlement spending (also called mandatory or direct spending), 
it can include mandatory instructions (called reconciliation instructions) to the relevant 
congressional committees to produce legislation consistent with those requirements.135 
Those reconciliation instructions order the relevant committees to report legislation by 
                                                        
 129. MARTIN GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 109 (3d ed. 2013) (“If a legislative amendment is 
proposed to an appropriations bill…a defense can be raised that the amendment is germane to legislative language 
in the House bill…  If the Senate holds the amendment germane, the point of order falls...  [T]his appeal…requires 
a simple majority of senators present.”).  
 130. OLESZEK, supra note 3, at 50.  
 131. But see GOLD, supra note 129, at 109 (describing a practice of submitting to the chair anyway). 
 132. For a summary by Senators of such custom, see 116 Cong. Rec. 41340, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., Dec. 14, 
1970.  
 133. Or filling the amendment tree so that no further amendments may be proposed. See Steven S. Smith, 
The Senate Syndrome, BROOKINGS INST. (June 2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/re-
search/files/papers/2010/6/cloture%20smith/06_cloture_smith.pdf.  
 134. 31 U.S.C § 1105(a) (2011). 
 135. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution: The Anatomy of the 1995-96 
Budget “Train Wreck,” 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 594 (1998) (asserting that this was a form developed in 1980 
by Leon Pannetta, then Chairman of the House Budget Committee, now Director of the CIA, at least insofar as 
it was applied to the first budget resolution rather than the second). 
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certain deadlines to conform tax revenues or entitlements to the budget resolution. Such 
legislation would then be procedurally privileged so as to enable Congress to pass it expe-
ditiously. Privileges include a germaneness requirement for amendments and a twenty-
hour limitation on debate, protecting reconciliation bills against filibuster.136 The Byrd 
Rule creates a three-fifths point of order against provisions in a reconciliation bill or con-
ference report that are “extraneous to the instructions to a committee.”137 
And for already-authorized programs (those programs and policies which have al-
ready been passed and do not require new authorizing legislation) the budget resolution’s 
allocations to the appropriations committees govern the appropriators’ work funding all 
ongoing and previously-authorized discretionary activities. The appropriations commit-
tees are responsible for the twelve annual appropriations bills that Congress must pass 
before it adjourns each year. If it fails to do so, Congress may pass continuing resolutions 
(CRs), which often merely continue current funding levels so that the government does 
not shut down while Congress tries to complete its work. 
This framework is the achievement of many rounds of Congressional legislative de-
sign regarding its own budgeting decisions, from the Budgeting and Accounting Act of 
1921,138 to the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act139 and beyond. 
These laws sought to rein in previous abuses, including Congress’ practice of considering 
tax and spending legislation ad hoc, without meaningful ways to bring them into relation-
ship with one another.140 
But this basic framework still fails to cabin decisions. Following the Reagan tax cuts 
in the early 1980’s, annual deficits ran to $200 billion each year more than double the 
highest previously recorded deficit.141 In response, Congress adopted the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA), commonly referred to as Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings (GRH) in honor of its sponsors.142 GRH introduced a number of major 
new concepts and devices, including the deficit and spending targets and the sequester, 
discussed further in Part II.D.1. 
1. How Budget Devices Constitute Precommitments 
On the most basic level, for the budget resolution to be meaningful it should impede 
                                                        
 136. Congressional Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–344, §§ 305(b)(2) & 
310(e)(1)–(2), 88 Stat 297 (1970) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2), 641(e)(1)(2)) [hereinafter the 
Congressional Budget Act].    
 137. See Congressional Budget Act, supra note 136, at § 310(c), 88 Stat. at 315; 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A). A 
provision is extraneous if, among other things, it does not produce a change in outlays or revenues, or those 
changes are merely incidental, or it causes the bill to exceed the applicable targets, or it changes Social Security. 
The Byrd Rule thus polices the boundaries of what can be passed using this “fast-track” method. 
138. Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67–13, 88 Stat. 297 (1921) (establishing the Presi-
dent’s budget bureau and GAO). 
139. Congressional Budget Act, supra note 136 (established Congress’ side of the budget process, including 
reconciliation, established CBO and the House and Senate Budget Committees). 
 140. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, supra note 135, at 592. See also Stith, supra note 13, at 600. 
 141. SCHICK, supra note 127, at 21 (reaching this high in FY 1981). 
 142. See generally Pub. L. No. No. 99–177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985). In this piece, I will use GRH to refer to the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA) in the form that it was originally 
passed.” By contrast, I will use “BBEDCA amended” to refer to the statutory sections as they have been changed 
over time, including the changes enacted in the Budget Control Act of 2011. 
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the passage of Congressional action that exceeds the budget. Indeed, the budget laws do 
so through at least two major methods, both of which I argue fit the classic structure of 
precommitment. The first method is reconciliation. Reconciliation bills are characteristi-
cally precommitment devices in the sense that the reconciliation legislation is procedurally 
privileged by statutized rules, and easier to pass because of exemptions from obstructing 
devices like filibusters or certain types of amendments.143 Thus, the notion that direct 
spending and revenue legislation will be more readily adopted if it conforms with the 
budget means that the time two reconciliation actions of Congress will have been eased by 
the time one decisions by Congress on the budget resolution, as well as, in a more general 
sense, by the time zero Congress enacting the budget framework procedures. 
The second major method by which the budget resolution impedes nonconforming 
legislation at time two is by subjecting that action to points of order.144 But points of order 
by themselves are not dispositive. They can be waived “by suspension of the rules, by 
unanimous consent, or, in the House, in a special rule” issued by the Rules Committee 
structuring debate on that bill.145 The Senate can generally waive rules by majority vote 
because usually only a majority vote is required to override the ruling of a chair when such 
ruling is appealed to the whole Senate.146 Further, the Senate, in some cases, may table a 
point of order by majority.147 Thus, most waiving of points of order and votes on appeals 
can be done by majority in the Senate. Correspondingly, a Special Rule can be passed by 
a majority vote of the full House.148 But the special discipline of the budget process was 
that it established certain points of order in the Senate that triggered sixty vote require-
ments to overturn the presiding officer or waive the application of those points of order.149 
For instance, Section 302(f)(2)(A) of the Congressional Budget Act as amended by 
GRH declares that in the Senate, after a budget resolution is adopted, any legislation that 
would cause the applicable allocation from the budget resolution to be exceeded will be 
out of order unless the point of order is waived by three-fifths majority.150 Some points of 
order also make it easier for a budget resolution to pass, which in turn reduces the difficulty 
of imposing such disciplining parameters.151 For instance, while the Senate usually permits 
                                                        
 143. Congressional Budget Act, supra note 136, § 310. See also ROBERT KEITH & BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33030, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS: HOUSE AND SENATE PROCEDURES 
(2005), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33030_20050810.pdf. (discussing Pub. L. No. 93–344, § 
310, 88 Stat. 297 (1970)).  
 144. Congressional Budget Act, 2 U.S.C. § 633 (f)(1)–(2) (subjecting such legislation to a point of order). 
 145. BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RES. SERV., RS20371, OVERVIEW OF THE AUTHORIZATION-APPROPRIATIONS 
PROCESS (2012), available at http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-pub-
lish.cfm?pid=‘0DP%2BPLW%3C%22%40%20%20%0A (noting that Suspension of the Rules in the House 
means passage under the procedural framework of House Rule XV, when bills require 2/3 vote, but are otherwise 
exempt from points of order.)   
 146. Floyd M. Riddick & Alan S. Frumin, Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices, 101st 
Cong., 2nd sess., S. Doc. 101–28, at 145 (1992). 
 147. See Gold & Gupta, supra note 56, at 261. 
 148. Stanley Bach, Special Rules in the House of Representatives: Themes and Contemporary Variations, 
(1981), available at http://stanistan.org/docs/1/5.pdf. 
 149. See BBEDCA, supra note 142. 
 150. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–25, 125 Stat. 240, at 25 (2011). 
 151. Id.  
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non-germane amendments before cloture152 they are subject to a three-fifths point of order 
on budget resolutions153 and on reconciliation legislation as well.154 
When Congress operated under GRH, the budget resolution totals were not the only 
target amounts that constrained Congressional action. GRH stipulated other sets of num-
bers: the maximum annual deficits and annual discretionary spending limits. Congres-
sional action that violated these new numbers, which existed independently from the 
budget resolution Congress set each year, would also invite points of order. For instance, 
Section 312(b) prohibited legislation that exceeds the discretionary spending limits set in 
Section 251(c) of GRH, while Section 312(c) prohibited budget resolutions that exceed 
the maximum deficit amount specified in GRH. Both are waivable only by three-fifths 
majority in the Senate. Thus GRH’s numbers, which are set at time one, were designed to 
make the passage of nonconforming legislation or contrary budget resolutions at time two 
more difficult. 
Another new mechanism introduced by GRH was the sequester, a significant pre-
commitment device.155 Congress’ breach of the deficit targets or the annual discretionary 
spending limits would trigger sequestration, an automatic cancellation of funds in accord-
ance with an across-the-board formula that would bring budget resources back in line with 
the time one GRH target deficit and spending levels.156 This cancellation, again, presum-
ably renders nonconforming spending at time two more difficult.157 While presented as 
“uniform” insofar as it distributes cuts “across-the-board,” the sequester does not inno-
cently represent Congress’ resolution to reduce the budget deficit in a way that is neutral 
to the expenditures cut.158 Apart from the many exceptions, and systematic biases that 
characterize the sequester,159 the sequester also encodes a particular policy privileging tax 
spending as opposed to program spending.  
2. The Budget Examples Fail to Bind 
Despite these elaborate efforts, Congress proved thoroughly capable of changing its 
budget and spending intentions at time two. GRH failed “both in terms of actually reducing 
                                                        
 152. The House generally prohibits non-germane amendments. They can be prohibited by Unanimous Consent 
(UC) in the Senate. 
 153. 2 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(2) & (c)(4). 
 154. 2 U.S.C. § 641(e). 
 155. See Westmoreland, supra note 13, at 1581 (specifically identifying the “precommitment” devices of GRH 
and Budget Enforcement Act and stating that they “created the significant precommitment devices of global caps 
on discretionary spending, PAYGO rules for mandatory spending, supermajorities to waive them, and se-
questers”). 
 156. A third type of sequestration which I discuss in subsection II.H infra is PAYGO sequestration, which is 
triggered when tax or entitlement legislation does not include offsetting spending cuts or revenue increases to 
pay for itself. 
 157. Though see Part II.H infra as to how it is a weak precommitment that can be, and was often, changed at 
time two. 
 158. Stith, supra note 140, at 652 (stating that “automatic sequestration, alters the political burden borne by 
those who would increase federal spending”). 
 159. See id. at 639–45. (describing how programs that have a higher outlay (spend-out) rates would be differ-
entially disadvantaged by sequestration relative to programs where spending is obligated early yet does not trans-
late into outlays until far into the future, since programs with such obligations tend to be exempted or non-
sequestrable. Personnel costs, for instance, incur faster outlay rates, while capital improvements spend-out more 
slowly. Programs with multi-year budget authority are also treated differently). 
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the deficit and introducing procedures capable of doing so.”160 Congress and the Admin-
istration engaged in gimmicks like pushing outlays to the next fiscal year by delaying a 
military payday by twenty-four hours. As Stith states, “GRH is only a statute, not a con-
stitutional amendment.”161 And indeed, one perverse outcome she identifies from this lim-
itation is that the stronger the penalty imposed by sequestration, the less binding the device 
becomes. The consequence of sequestration might become so uncomfortable that Congress 
has greater incentive to exercise its legislative power to simply change or repeal it. 
Indeed, Congress often “contracted around” GRH. After sequestration was triggered 
in 1984, Congress simply passed COBRA 1985, under privileged reconciliation rules no 
less, to restore the sequestered funds.162 
This situation has led observers to identify precommitment in the budget context as 
a perfect device for political cover. It appears as though the present Congress is doing 
something to constrain spending, leaving future Congresses the ability to spend when they 
so desire.163 
3. Budget Devices as an Exercise of Legalism 
Legalism frames actions as dictated by rules so they appear neutral. The political 
choice involved in any decision is camouflaged by appeal to the false necessity of the rule. 
Likewise, many of these budget precommitments purport to shield legislators from direct 
political value trade-offs. Elster identifies the idea of a balanced budget amendment as 
motivated by the same logic: “Representatives need to be able to tell their constituents that 
their hands are tied.”164 Tim Westmoreland argues that budget rules deflect accountability 
and disguise political decisions.165 For instance, expanding prenatal care and providing 
certain vaccines would violate the score-keeping and other rules implementing the Con-
gressional Budget Act, “but for reasons that no Member of Congress would be willing to 
defend in public.”166 The reason why such proposals would draw a budget point of order 
is because the CBO’s score-keeping model includes “survivor’s costs,” which frequently 
doom health provisions. The modeling of survivor’s costs within the structure of the 
Budget Act, which asymmetrically requires weighing of budgetary costs, but not benefits, 
means that the benefits of helping people live longer are not considered; they do not pro-
duce savings, and are instead scored as costs for the reason that saving lives of children 
who would have died means that they will live to consume health care and other benefits 
throughout their remaining lives. It is cheaper for the government if premature children 
and others die. But this consideration is framed as a budget point of order that cloaks the 
                                                        
 160. See Christopher D. Dodge, Doomed to Repeat: Why Sequestration and the Budget Control Act of 2011 
are Unlikely to Solve Our Solvency Woes, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 845 (2012) (observing that “in 
1990, when the budget deficit was supposed to have progressively shrunk to zero, it was actually at a record 
high”). 
 161. Stith, supra note 13, at 652. 
 162. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–272, 100 Stat. 82. See also 
GRH 1987, 2 U.S.C.A. § 905 (2013). 
 163. Stith, supra note 13, at 668. 
 164. UNBOUND, supra note 11, at 142. 
 165. Westmoreland, supra note 13, at 1600. 
 166. Id. at 1599. 
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political acceptability or unacceptability of such an argument. Westmoreland asks 
“[s]hould legislation to establish these interventions have fallen on a parliamentary point 
of order” as opposed to consideration on the particular merits of the matter.167 The partic-
ular equities of the issue have been rendered invisible by the rule. 
E. Case Study 2: “Recusal” Delegation 
Certain Congressional precommitment examples depend upon Congress’ abdication 
of power to other political actors whom they hope will hold them accountable at time two. 
Certain types of delegation fall into this category. While arguably even ordinary adminis-
trative delegation has some concessionary effect, agency action is still thought to derive 
from statutory authorization, and therefore remains, in theory, subject to Congressional 
override.168 The Congressional Review Act ostensibly makes it even easier for Congress 
to override by providing that with respect to “major regulations,” a congressional resolu-
tion of disapproval will be privileged against filibuster in the Senate, though still largely 
subject to normal rules in the House.169 
A number of other laws also use privileged resolutions but to empower an agency 
relative to Congress. BRAC, for instance, empowers executive actors relative to Congress 
insofar as it limits Congressional overrides to only one type of action—an approval or 
disapproval of the entire package of base closures with no change. These types of precom-
mitment employ both delegation as well as modification of procedural status for a class of 
Congressional actions—a restriction on amendments to the resolution of disapproval. Such 
a resolution of disapproval usually involves not only statutized rules, but also a “notwith-
standing” clause. The “notwithstanding” clause ensures both that Congress must jump 
through the particular hoops pertaining to the resolution of disapproval to be effective in 
overriding the delegation, and that the delegated outcome will obtain without regard to 
other laws outside this class.170 This combination of precommitment devices is what Mi-
chael Teter calls “recusal legislation.”171 
1. Recusal Delegation as Legalism 
Just as legalism functions to elevate the “legally-required” and disparage politics, the pre-
commitment device of recusal delegation changes the nature of decision-making away 
from value-based toward more rule-based decision making. Recusal delegation also priv-
ileges the general principle, and renders particular merits irrelevant. Yet, the motivations 
behind recusal-legislation seem to depend on the slippage in our understanding of whether 
                                                        
 167. Id. at 1598–99. 
 168. Cf. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE 
THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (arguing that ordinary delegation relieves Congress of having to make hard policy 
choices). But see Peter Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 775 (1999) (detailing why Schoenbrod is mistaken).  
 169. Garrett, supra note 86, at 724–25 (characterizing the CRA as largely symbolic). 
 170. See, e.g., Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100–526, § 205(1), 102 Stat. 2623 (authorizing the Secretary to follow the base closure recommendations 
“without regard to any provision of law restricting the use of funds for closing or realigning military installations 
included in any appropriation or authorization Act”). 
 171. Teter, supra note 51.  
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such decisions should be legally governed or politically accountable. In Dalton v. Specter, 
Justice Souter, concurring in part, stated that Congress recognized that base closure was 
“politically difficult” and so it devised a scheme that would “bind its hands from untying 
a package.”172 This structure of submitting to the “general” principle while supporting a 
different result for the “particular” case provides political cover.173 In this arrangement, 
Congress only votes on “the abstract and consensus notion of cutting spending by elimi-
nating . . . bases. A ‘veil of ignorance’ provides members cover to vote for the measure, 
whether they have a base in their district or not.”174 Brito cites Senator Phil Gramm ex-
plaining the convenient posture of an individual legislator under the BRAC arrangement, 
a quote I reproduce in full here because it is so revealing (and colorful): 
 
The beauty of this proposal is that, if you have a military base in your 
district . . . under this proposal, I have 60 days. So, I come up here and 
say, “God have mercy. Don’t close this base in Texas. We can get at-
tacked from the South. The Russians are going to go after our leadership 
and you know they are going to attack Texas. We need this base.” Then 
I can go out and lie down in the street and the bulldozers are coming and 
I have a trusty aide there just as it gets there to drag me out of the way. 
All the people . . . will say ‘You know, Phil Gramm got whipped, but it 
was like the Alamo, He was with us until the last second.’175 
 
2. Do Recusals and Other Delegations Bind? 
These are instances where Congress empowers third parties against itself, just as 
Ulysses empowered his crew to ignore his later commands to untie him. But we have 
learned through experience with the Line-Item Veto Act,176 the original GRH mechanism 
granting the Comptroller General authority in triggering the sequester,177 and the legisla-
tive veto device,178 that executive-legislative power-sharing pacts are often struck. It ap-
pears that Congress’ toolkit for empowering the executive against the legislature is lim-
ited.179 Certainly ordinary delegation remains available, but it can always be overcome by 
statutory override. To the extent that recusal delegation depends upon statutized rules and 
notwithstanding clauses, the mechanism rests on shaky ground indeed. 
Meanwhile the success of BRAC was, on closer inspection, short-lived. While the 
“initial BRAC Commission ratified all DoD’s recommended base closures without adding 
or subtracting from the list,” later commissions modified the list, principally to exempt 
                                                        
 172. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 481–82 (1994).  
 173. Jerry Brito, Running for Cover: The BRAC Commission as a Model for Federal Spending Reform, 9 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2011). 
 174. Id. at 143. 
 175. Id. at 142–43.  
 176. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 177. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 178. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 179. This limitation applies to the converse situation as well, in empowering the legislature against the exec-
utive, as was the case for the legislative veto. 
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bases in districts represented by members on the Armed Services or Defense Appropria-
tions Committee. Brito concludes that BRAC only works under certain circumstances and 
one of those circumstances, present only for the first round of cuts, was that Congress 
could agree on what to do: “The first round of cuts was made up of ‘low-hanging fruit’—
the most egregious examples of surplus bases on which most could agree.”180 It con-
strained only in instances when preferences were aligned anyway. 
F. An Important Case: Entitlements (Including Taxes and Formulae) 
Though Elster specifically mentions constitutionalized economic and social rights 
as precommitments,181 statutory entitlements are not as regularly grouped among precom-
mitment devices. Here I review the argument as to why entitlements, even sub-constitu-
tional ones,182 could arguably qualify as precommitments. Entitlements generate budget-
ary consequences insofar as a beneficiary meeting the eligibility criteria outlined in law 
may sue to enforce the delivery of benefits specified in statute.183 Therefore, Congress 
cannot set contrary limits on the funding of such a program without changing the author-
izing law.184 This “mandatory” or “direct” spending contrasts with discretionary spending 
where “[t]he legal presumption . . . is that it will not be renewed unless Congress takes 
affirmative steps to do so.”185 Congress appears, in the case of entitlements, to have sur-
rendered some of its later appropriations discretion to another political actor—the courts—
though it still retains authority to change the authorizing language at any time so as to 
retract the mandatory funding obligation.186 
1. The Ties of Entitlement Unravel 
But even the previous description oversimplifies: for instance, what one has an en-
titlement to in Medicaid is deeply undercut by state flexibilities, such as those included in 
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2006 (DRA).187 Medicaid has been classified as an entitle-
                                                        
 180. Brito, supra note 173, at 144. 
 181. UNBOUND, supra note 11, at 141–42. 
 182. Constitutional rights would not fall within the set of Congressional precommitments, because they would 
represent the sovereign binding Congress, rather than Congress binding itself. 
 183. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Goldberg 
v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532 (1985). See also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997); Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
The statutory language must, among other requirements, be sufficiently mandatory to admit of individual en-
forcement. And while “shall” is one such indication of the mandatory nature of the provision, its effect can be 
undercut by language such as “subject to the availability of appropriations,” or statements that under such law 
“there are authorized to be appropriated funds for.” Westmoreland, supra note 13, at 1566. See also TIMOTHY 
JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? 46–50 (2003). 
 184.  And we have discussed earlier, see infra Part II.D, how appropriations bills are procedurally favored 
compared to other authorizing legislation. 
 185. Westmoreland, supra note 13, at 1565. 
 186. This mechanism of ceding authority to courts may at first glance appear to be a fourth method of Con-
gressional precommitment, distinct from supermajorities, statutized rules, or notwithstanding clauses, but we will 
see that entitlements essentially depend on statutized rules.  
 187. Harper Jean Tobin & Rochelle Bobroff, The Continuing Viability of Medicaid Rights After the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 147 (2009), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-
law-journal-pocket-part/legislation/the-continuing-viability-of-medicaid-rights-after-the-deficit-reduction-act-
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ment because of the central requirement that states must “mak[e] medical assistance avail-
able . . . to all [eligible] individuals.188 Moreover, that medical assistance is defined a cer-
tain way, with certain mandatory and other optional benefits. However, under the DRA, 
states no longer have to provide certain eligible populations189 with the statutorily defined 
benefit package. Instead, states can get federal approval to provide either a “benchmark” 
package, which waters down the guarantees under law, or even a “benchmark equivalent” 
package, which allows even more state discretion to substitute actuarially equivalent al-
ternatives for parts of the benchmark package. What then has Congress bound itself to 
fund at time two? The answer is increasingly blurred. Given these flexibilities, what is the 
specific content to which one is entitled and is the word “entitlement” meaningful under 
these circumstances?  
Also, the premise that courts would step in to enable beneficiaries to enforce the 
delivery at time two of what Congress promised at time one is overstated. The availability 
of medical care depends not just on the specified content of the “medical assistance”190 
basket, but also on, for instance, the number of providers willing to provide such services. 
Having to travel to the next county to find a specialist, or queuing on a long waitlist to see 
the one dentist willing to take Medicaid patients severely undercuts the promise of medical 
assistance, even if the services were well-specified as part of the benefit basket. One might 
look to the Medicaid law and find that the federal statute contains an “Equal Access” pro-
vision, requiring state financing and payment to be “sufficient to enlist enough providers 
so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care 
and services are available to the general population in the geographic area.”191 But that 
provision has proven difficult to enforce in court. Whether an aggrieved person has a right 
of action under Section 1983192 turns on a three-prong test, whether the provision is clearly 
intended to benefit plaintiffs, whether it is phrased as a mandatory obligation, and not so 
vague and amorphous as to strain judicial competence. Courts have made this and related 
rights of action increasingly unavailable.193 
Moreover, the Social Security Act’s Medicaid requirements have always been liber-
ally waived. Sections 1115 and 1915 of the Social Security Act (SSA) allow the federal 
government to waive virtually any of the requirements of the Medicaid statute for “demon-
stration” and other purposes. The existence of waivers gravely undermines the assurance 
that a state can be held to any particular aspect of Medicaid law.194 For instance, Tennessee 
obtained an ambitious section 1115 waiver in the 1990’s, easing the federal requirements 
                                                        
of-2005/. 
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A) (2014). 
 189. Children, working parents, and pregnant women above 133% of poverty. 
 190. Often challenged in terms of whether it provides assistance sufficient in “Amount Duration and Scope.”  
 191. 42 U.S.C § 1396(a)(30)(A). 
 192. Some of these cases have also considered the question of whether a right of action arises under the Su-
premacy Clause. See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 546 (2012). 
 193. Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitle-
ments, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413 (2008). And recently the Supreme Court has even further undercut the implied 
Ex Parte Young cause of action. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015). See also 
Douglas, 132 S. Ct. 546.  
 194. David J. Barron & Todd Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013). 
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for medical assistance in order to allow Tennessee to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in man-
aged care. The conversion to managed care was intended to save money and thereby enable 
the state to use those resources to extend eligibility to new populations. The terms of the 
waiver, as with so many waivers of this type, promised Tennessee the federal dollars to 
which they would otherwise have been entitled, but in return, they could impose enroll-
ment caps.195 Two decades later, we find the newly eligible—those who have extremely 
high medical bills but would ordinarily not qualify for Medicaid—must be among the first 
2,500 callers in a twice-a-year open enrollment window of typically one hour. Access to 
medical assistance depends on applicants dialing as fast as they can to request Medicaid 
during the brief time slot.196 This portrait of a telephone lottery dictating whether one re-
ceives health care bears very little resemblance to the assurance and automatic quality that 
we imagine entitlements, as Congressional precommitments, to offer. 
To the extent Congress has arguably ceded to any outside actors, those actors are the 
ones to which Congress routinely delegates: the states, and the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”), the agency in charge of approving the state plans. The charac-
terization of Congress’ accountability to beneficiaries, or the courts, is much weaker. Once 
one takes into account the enrollment or federal funding caps associated with state waivers, 
the difference between an “entitlement program” and ordinary block grant or other pro-
grams becomes even less distinct. Yet, even this account overclaims Congress’ actual ob-
ligations: Congress can change the authorization language at any time to repeal the author-
ization of states and agencies in this regard. The only thing Congress has even ostensibly 
relinquished is the ability to limit or repeal the entitlement through appropriations, rather 
than through the authorization process. Yet, as we have seen in Part II.D above, Congress’ 
statutized and standing rules distinguishing authorization and appropriations are them-
selves frequently overridden. 
If, despite all these reservations, entitlements are precommitments nonetheless, such 
a label must also attach to revenue measures. Any tax provision is presumed to continue, 
unless changed or sunset, and courts are certainly employed to sanction those who do not 
pay taxes.197 Tax “spending,” in the form of exemptions and deductions favoring certain 
populations, is thus symmetrical to entitlement spending. For instance, tax “spending” to 
favor employer-sponsored health benefits is also a mandatory “cost” insofar as the amount 
foregone is not capped, and enjoyment of the deduction can be judicially enforced. 
These examples of ostensible precommitment inevitably bleed into ordinary legisla-
tion. As Bruhl has said, “all legislation--or rather, all legislation that lacks a sunset clause-
-has this kind of de facto entrenching effect of establishing a new status quo.198 
                                                        
 195. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Tennessee Section 1115 Waiver Amendment Pro-
posal Fact Sheet, KAISER COMMISSION KEY FACTS (Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., D.C., Oct. 2004), available 
at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/tennessee-section-1115-waiver-amendment-pro-
posal-fact-sheet.pdf.  
 196. See Abby Goodnough, Tennessee Race for Medicaid: Dial Fast and Try, Try Again, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
24, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/us/tennessee-holds-health-care-lottery-for-the-
poor.html?pagewanted=all. 
 197. See Bruhl, supra note 50, at 373 (explaining that Social Security is not legally entrenching, just as tax 
rates are not, because neither provision is insulated). 
 198. Id. at 377.  
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2. The SGR Formula for Physician Payment under Medicare: A Special Variant 
of Entitlement Logic 
As we test this concept of Congressional precommitment further, we might ask 
whether any formula represents a binding precommitment device by creating an automatic 
method of payment or distribution that obtains without separate decision about allot-
ment.199 This might not apply with respect to a formula that allots funds that are themselves 
capped or subject to appropriations, but it is worth considering with respect to formulae in 
entitlement programs. 
The Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) depended on a formula that is of particular rel-
evance to the IPAB mission, as some observers have said that this payment formula, which 
has only recently been modified by Congress, was likely to be targeted by IPAB.200 
The story of the SGR begins with the initial passage of Medicare, an entitlement 
program that had a very generous “open-ended cost-reimbursement system” in order to 
mollify any opposition, especially that of physicians whose lobbying group had spiked 
previous federal health coverage legislation. Therefore, under Medicare, physicians were 
initially paid for their services to Medicare beneficiaries according to their “usual” and 
“customary” fees.201 In other words, physicians were being paid fee-for-service, at fees 
they set themselves. And due in part to the ability of physicians to induce demand for their 
own services, rapid inflation ensued.202 The year after Medicare began, general physicians’ 
rates rose twenty-five percent and internists’ rates grew forty percent.203 
Congress then tried to curb this dynamic by setting fees for a variety of physician 
services through the Resource-Based Value System (RBVS).204 However, RBVS still did 
not control volume.205 Therefore, Congress established the SGR, which compared aggre-
gate Medicare expenditures for physician services to a certain target. If those expenditures 
exceeded the target, the SGR mechanism reduced the inflationary update applied to phy-
sicians’ fees for the upcoming year to compensate. The target was calculated based on the 
increase in prices for physician services, the increase in the number of Medicare benefi-
ciaries, estimated per-capita GDP growth, as well as any laws or regulatory changes that 
might otherwise have altered the physician services provided under Medicare.206 
                                                        
 199. Not all formulae are entitlements. Certainly the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) formula is 
subject to funding caps, and there is a formula for qualifying as health care underserved communities for HRSA 
funding that is subject to appropriations. 
 200. See, e.g., Ann Marie Marciarille & J. Bradford DeLong, Bending the Health Cost Curve: The Promise 
and Peril of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 75, 105 (2012) (predicting that phy-
sician payments would be a likely focus for IPAB). For the legislation passed April 16, 2015, finally reforming 
the SGR after nearly 20 years, see, Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA), Pub. L. 
No. 114-10. 
 201. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Charles C. Griffin, & Caitlin Carroll, U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: 
Historical Development and Choices for the 1990s, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141 (1993). 
 202. See, e.g., Jacqueline Fox, Recent Development: Death Panels: A Defense of the Independent Payment 
Advisory Board, 66 ADMIN L. REV. 131, 141 (2014). 
 203. Jill Quadagno, Why the United States Has No National Health Insurance: Stakeholder Mobilization 
Against the Welfare State, 1945-1996, 45 FLA. ST. J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 25, 33 (2004). 
 204. Which replaced the Medicare Volume Performance Standard. 
 205. Among numerous other problems, such as skewing toward specialty groups. 
 206. M. Kent Clemens, Estimated Sustainable Growth Rate and Conversion Factor, for Medicaid Payments 
to Physicians in 2015, CENTERS FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS. (Apr. 2014), available at 
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Each year since 2002, the aggregate amount charged by physicians has indeed ex-
ceeded that which might be predicted by the factors of price inflation, growth in the patient 
population, economic growth, and regulatory change. Yet each year, physicians have lob-
bied Congress successfully to refrain from taking this excess growth out of their fee up-
dates for the next year.207 Such repeated deferrals have caused the accumulated cost of the 
Congressional override to mount accordingly. In January 2013, doctors should have re-
ceived a cumulative 26.5 percent cut in pay, costing $25.2 billion to defer. Yet Congress 
agreed to do so through December 31, 2013 in the fiscal cliff deal, with a further three-
month, $7.3 billion deferral hammered out in the “modest” budget and appropriations deal 
achieved for FY 2014.208 
G. Other Candidates for Precommitment and Their Similarities to “Ordinary” 
Legislation 
There are assorted other examples of precommitment that I mention briefly or not at 
all.209 Garrett has examined the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, which subjects any Con-
gressional measure reaching some threshold impact on states and localities to a point of 
order, waivable initially only by a supermajority, but in later years subject to majority 
waiver.210 Majority waiver, Garret contends, still changes the degree of difficulty of pass-
ing such a measure, because it makes such measures subject to separation from the rest of 
the legislative package for an independent roll-call vote.211 Many measures that would 
survive if integrated into an omnibus offering other offsetting desirable elements could not 
prevail in stand-alone consideration requiring members to go on record on that single is-
sue. By this analysis, the very common practice of rolling appropriations or other legisla-
tion into an omnibus form is arguably a precommitment because someone is choosing a 
form of legislation in order to increase costs and pressures on those who would block the 
bill. The pressure arises because everyone else wants something contained in the omni-
bus.212 However, I do not classify the omnibus form as a Congressional precommitment 
because it does not represent Congress binding itself at time two. Instead, omnibus bills 
are a case of party leaders trying to bring the party to heel, and make it more difficult for 
the rank-and-file members to undermine the deals their leadership has struck. The actors 
are therefore different from our other examples, which I restrict to the legislature binding 
                                                        
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/SustainableGRatesConFact/Down-
loads/sgr2015p.pdf. 
 207. Uwe Reinhardt, The Annual Drama of the ‘Doc Fix,’ ECONOMIX: N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Dec. 17, 2010, 6:00 
AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/the-annual-drama-of-the-doc-fix/. See also Mary Agnes 
Carey, FAQ On Medicare Doctor Pay: Why is it So Hard to Fix?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 27, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/december/15/faq-doc-fix.aspx. 
 208. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATE OF THE BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF H.R. 8, THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER 
RELIEF ACT OF 2012 (2013). As of this writing, Congress seems poised to extend the patch yet again, for one-
year until March 31, 2015, at a cost of $20 billion. 
 209. Stith, supra note 13, at 662. 
 210. Garrett, supra note 50, at 1499. 
 211. Id. at 1503–04. 
 212. See also Krishnakumar, supra note 135, at 596 (attributing the omnibus reconciliations bills as crucial to 
the success of Reagan’s economic program, “because dissatisfied congressman would be unlikely to kill an entire 
budget agenda over a few disagreeable provisions”). 
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itself rather than one part of the legislature binding another.213 
H. Drawing Lessons Regarding Commitment v. Precommitment: Hard Chains or Soft 
Norms? 
This article follows Elster in restricting the term “precommitment” to those time one 
actions that operate by means of some external mechanism, rather than mere internal res-
olution. 
Contrasting their notion of “external commitments” with Elsterian precommitments, 
John Ferejohn and Lawrence Sager have explained, “[o]n our account, external commit-
ments do not need to be mechanical, operate causally, or be decisively efficacious.”214 
They include commitments that can work more by manipulating “internal resolve” or gen-
erating normative force. Sometimes, the actor achieves a result not because the mechanism 
of the precommitment device is dispositive, but because its invocation signifies an inten-
sity of preference. There may be a common understanding among members of Congress 
that the use of such a device signifies a high level of resolve. If someone announces that a 
policy will be effectuated using the device that was used in BRAC, that policy design may 
prove effective simply by virtue of the heightened intention it signals. When framework 
legislation engenders this type of effect, Garrett classifies it as serving a “symbolic” pur-
pose.215 
Vermeule and Posner also refer to “policy choices that become entrenched de facto 
through path dependence and inertia.”216 Even though the fast-track rules can be changed 
by simple majority, Garrett contributes the idea that political consequences still apply be-
cause the rejection by Congress of the President’s fast-track authority would be a politi-
cally “salient” event.217 A subcategory of these “softly” entrenched statutes might be 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s superstatutes, which have become more difficult to extirpate by 
virtue of political support and public normative coalescence around these laws.218 
Elster himself was careful to distinguish norms or conventions from binding con-
straints that he classifies as precommitments.219 Conventions and social norms constrain 
but, unlike other types of binding constraints, they are found and not freely invented.220 
For Elster, the process of changing conventions, the development of new collective self-
understanding, remains mysterious. Indeed, my argument relies on this distinction—be-
tween the technical, freely-invented devices that bind, compared to the “softer” social 
norms that constrain by imposing political consequences—by showing that the examples 
                                                        
 213. Some have argued that government contracts are precommitments. But I do not include contracts within 
the core examples of Congressional precommitment because they are not precisely Congress binding itself, but 
Congress allowing the executive branch to bind itself, and the Constitution then preventing the legislature from 
untying those bonds.  
 214. John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1939 
(2003). 
 215. Garrett, supra note 86, at 733–36. 
 216. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1676 (emphasis added). 
 217. Garrett, supra note 86, at 747. 
 218. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES (2010). 
 219. UNBOUND, supra note 11, at 4. 
 220. Id. at 196–99. 
33
Ho: Budgeting on Autopilot: Do Sequestration and the Independent Paym
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
HO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2015  3:20 PM 
728 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:695  
that IPAB and the sequester seek to emulate work by the latter, non-mechanistic means. 
This distinction underlies the identification of “legalism,” the ideology of rule-following, 
as distinct from a plainer operation of “law,” which attaches consequences to rule-viola-
tion.221 
1. Hard Chains Fail: Entrenching Statutes Bleed Into Ordinary Laws 
In our analysis of Congress and precommitment so far, the problem emerges that 
legislative precommitment is only possible if Congress truly has the means to bind itself, 
to meaningfully encumber future options. Yet examination of these various examples 
leaves that in doubt. Many scholars have examined these and indeed have staged a vigor-
ous dialogue over whether Congress should be able to bind itself. My analysis thus far 
sidesteps this debate even as it benefits from the premise—that Congress currently can-
not—leaving open the question that I address, namely, why Congress engages in this form 
of action nonetheless. 
Even if Congress were judicially restrained from directly changing statutized rules 
or other entrenching statutes, it is still too easy for Congress to evade the effect of its own 
rules. Creative drafting can almost always elude constraints. Although Congress ostensibly 
promised to disclose all “earmarks” or special interest pork-barrel projects,222 Kysar illus-
trates how Congress could always draft around the earmarks restrictions.223 For example, 
earmarks are defined as applying to ten or fewer beneficiaries.224 A provision giving tax 
relief for “domestically manufactured arrows”225 may only (or disproportionately) affect 
two companies, but unless one had extensive knowledge of the industry or the process, a 
reader would not be able to tell from the language on its face that it represented an earmark. 
Posner and Vermeule offer another example. Their “no bicycles in the park” law could be 
undermined by defining “bicycles as two-wheeled vehicles manufactured before 1900” 
and “shmicycles” as two-wheeled vehicles manufactured after 1900.226 In Part IV.B.6, I 
consider the manifold ways by which Congress could circumvent IPAB’s purported en-
trenchment. 
2. The Limited Cases of Success are Better Explained by Soft Norms 
Some have pointed to counterexamples. Indeed, entitlements under which Congress 
submits voluntarily to judicial enforcement have persisted, thereby empowering another 
government actor. But the problems of entitlements abound, as we have noted above, sug-
gesting that there is case-by-case decision-making on whether the protection of an entitle-
ment extends, rather than a clear automatic rule that at time two Congress will uphold the 
promise. 
                                                        
 221. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Noonday Press, 1954) (1832) (pro-
pounding a “sanction” or “command” theory of law). 
 222. In the House, through H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted), and in the Senate through a statute, The 
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–81, Sec. 521, 121 Stat. 735, 760. 
 223. Kysar, supra note 13, at 545, 550–51. 
 224. Id. at 567. 
 225. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–357 §332, 118 Stat. 1418, 1477. 
 226. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1669. 
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On inspection, other candidates for success have relied on norms, not precommit-
ment, for their effect and remain vulnerable to running aground on any particularly com-
pelling case. PAYGO, otherwise known as “pay-as-you-go” rules, worked reasonably well 
for the years that they were in effect. PAYGO was also an innovation of the GRH legisla-
tion, and it was designed to rein in tax and entitlement authorizing legislation, rather than 
setting limits on discretionary spending alone. It required new tax and entitlement spend-
ing to be “paid for” or offset by revenue-increases or other direct spending cuts and was 
enforced not merely by points of order, but also by sequestration. However, Allan Schick 
notes, “[i]t is highly probable that even in the absence of [PAYGO rules in the 1990s], big 
deficits would have deterred Congress and the [P]resident from establishing new entitle-
ments and impelled them to seek savings in old ones.”227 In other words, public opinion 
constrained the White House and Congress as much as any automatic device for fiscal 
discipline. Then in 2002, PAYGO was allowed to lapse amid the passage of the Bush 
Administration’s Medicare prescription drug proposal and tax cut package. 
The filibuster, though subject to the nuclear option,228 has survived since the early 
1800’s,229 but was always subject to exceptions, such as any statutized rule that fast-tracks 
a class of legislation by limiting debate. Likewise, BRAC is frequently cited as a success, 
but it arguably failed to work in the second round, foundering on the competing political 
demands of the powerful defense-related committee members. 
Garrett claims that UMRA has worked, but in her account, UMRA constrains by 
means of political norms. It is not necessarily enforceable by courts, but may still have bite 
insofar as it disaggregates logrolling, which forces political accountability.230 If its effect 
relies on political accountability, UMRA is a creature of soft norms. 
Regarding GRH, Stith concludes that “[u]ltimately . . . this constraint is political, 
not legal.”231 Again, these devices are at best “soft precommitments,” more akin to social 
norms than an automatic mechanism that can be intentionally devised. 
All of these examples illustrate that self-binding works until it does not. It works 
because people are willing to constrain themselves but does not add any further discipline 
to prevent people from engaging in conduct if they wish to flout the constraint. But this 
discussion has thus far bracketed the question of whether the devices worked by other, 
normative means, by changing Congress’ wishes such that they might be less likely to wish 
to breach. Passing these ostensibly precommitting rules may not have changed the external 
difficulties faced at time two, but people, including the voting public, may believe that 
conforming to constraints and following rules has some special moral force. Thus, 
breaches of the precommitment are breaches of this norm and therefore bear consequences 
in the theater of public opinion. If so, then these episodes illustrate the force of the ideology 
                                                        
 227. SCHICK, supra note 127, at 32. 
 228. For yet another example of the nuclear option employed to circumvent the filibuster, see, e.g., Roberts & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 61, 1780 (recounting an instance in 1975 where the Senate Chair declared that the 
cloture rule could be changed by a simple majority, and was upheld by a majority vote of the Senate, though the 
Senate then voted to conceal the precedent-setting vote). 
 229. Examining the Filibuster: History of the Filibuster 1798-2008: Hearing Before the Committee on Rules 
and Administration, 111th Cong. 45 (Apr. 22, 2010) (statement of Sarah Binder, Senior Fellow, The Brookings 
Institution), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/04/22-filibuster-binder. 
 230. Garrett, supra note 50, at 1515. 
 231. Stith, supra note 13, at 664. 
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of “legalism” that Shklar identifies. We may have exposed these Congressional commit-
ments as unable to exert the determinate power that they purport, but under the right con-
ditions, they may still exert the normative power of legalism. 
III: SEQUESTRATION IN THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT (BCA) OF 2011 
A. The Political Context of the BCA Sequestration 
Since the enactment of the health reform through which IPAB became law, the po-
litical battles over budget and spending have escalated in pitch. In 2011, Congress passed 
appropriations bills232 enacting spending levels that it then tried to disavow by refusing to 
raise the statutory debt ceiling to accommodate the spending already approved.233 This led 
to a standoff causing major credit rating agencies to downgrade the U.S. Treasury below 
triple-A status for the first time since 1917.234 
The 2011 debt ceiling crisis finally resulted in the August 2, 2011 BCA legislation, 
which then triggered automatic sequestration of federal funds scheduled for January 1, 
2013, coinciding with the expiration of the Bush tax cuts. The Congressional response to 
this so-called “fiscal cliff” in the American Taxpayer Reform Act of 2012 (ATRA) did not 
wholly avert but instead delayed sequestration by three months. 
If, in the course of government activity, outlays exceed the amount in the U.S. Treas-
ury, the government issues debt.235 The debt ceiling, originally passed as part of the Liberty 
Bond Act of 1917, limits the Treasury Secretary’s authority to issue debt in order to com-
port with the spending requirements authorized and appropriated by Congress.236 As Bu-
chanan and Dorf remark, this debt has already been approved by Congress each year when 
Congress sets the spending and revenue levels.237 The existence of the statutory debt limit, 
however, means that Congress has to separately approve the foreseeable consequences of 
what it has already approved. When the accumulated consequences of the spending levels 
result in debt approaching the ceiling Congress has set, Congress has raised the ceiling, 
sometimes through intricate mechanisms. For some period, the debt limit was raised 
through a mechanism called the “Gephardt Rule,” under which Congress’ decision to pass 
a budget resolution exceeding the debt ceiling was deemed to have raised the debt ceil-
ing.238 The votes to raise the debt ceiling have historically tended to be treated as a routine 
                                                        
 232. See Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–10, 125 
Stat. 38. 
 233. See Alan Silverleib & Tom Cohen, Latest Deficit Talks End with a Tense Exchange, CNN (July 13, 2011, 
11:41 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/07/13/debt.talks/. 
 234. Charles Riley, S&P Downgrades U.S. Credit Rating, CNN (Aug. 6, 2011, 8:13 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/05/news/economy/downgrade_rumors/index.htm. 
 235. See Anita Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Ceiling, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135 (2005). 
 236. D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31967, THE DEBT LIMIT: HISTORY 
AND RECENT INCREASES (2013), available at http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-pub-
lish.cfm?pid=‘0E%2C*P%5C%3F%3D%23%20%20%20%0A. See also Alan Silverleib, Debt Ceiling Votes: 
From Routine to Radioactive, CNN (Jul. 7, 2011, 10:35 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/07/06/debt.ceiling.fight/index.html. 
 237. Neil Buchanan & Michael Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the Pres-
ident (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (2012), available at http://www.co-
lumbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Buchanan-Dorf.pdf. 
 238. This mechanism is either ingenious, insofar as it shields Members from having to cast a recorded vote 
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matter. Since 1960, Congress has raised the debt limit seventy-eight times according to the 
Treasury website.239 
In the aftermath of the spending packages responding to the economic downturn of 
2007, the federal debt mounted and was due to pierce the ceiling by May 16, 2011. The 
government, by “extraordinary measures,” was able to extend borrowing capacity to post-
pone the deadline for Congressional action until August 2011. However, House Republi-
cans declared their intention to block any increase to the debt limit. 
In freezing the statutory debt ceiling, and threatening government default, the Re-
publican opposition saw an opportunity to extract from President Obama and the Senate 
Democratic majority significant concessions to a starve-the-government agenda. Though 
the sluggish economy could arguably have continued to benefit from fiscal stimulus, Dem-
ocrats were willing to rein in budget deficits if the methods included revenue-side re-
form.240 Republicans insisted upon entitlement cuts without raising taxes or additional rev-
enue.241 The substance of an overall compromise budget, revenue, and spending deal was 
unattainable. At the last possible moment however, a deal was struck that cut an initial 
roughly $900 billion in federal spending, and otherwise established a particular set of con-
ditional arrangements that deferred agreement on the substance of a compromise. BCA 
passed on August 2, 2011 with the barest of majorities.242 The deal temporarily extended 
the debt limit,243 promised a vote on a Balanced Budget constitutional amendment,244 and, 
in the meantime, established a “Supercommittee” charged with a November 23, 2011 
deadline to negotiate a long-term substantive deal to achieve a target deficit reduction over 
the next ten years.245 Such a deal would be given expedited consideration by Congress,246 
but if Congress could not pass such a bill or an alternative containing such savings, then 
automatic sequestration of $1.2 trillion, above the $900 billion already slated for cuts, 
                                                        
baldly representing their desire to raise the debt, or obtuse, insofar as it takes a circuitous path to the obvious, 
which is that any vote for a budget that exceeds the debt limit represents a position that the debt limit should rise.  
 239. U.S. Treasury, Debt Limit, TREASURY.GOV, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/pages/debtlimit.aspx. 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
 240. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President Addressed in the State Dining Room (Aug. 
8, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/08/remarks-president. 
 241. See Manu Raju & Jake Sherman, John Boehner Open to More Revenues, POLITICO (Dec. 12, 2012, 6:54 
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/fiscal-cliff-boehner-open-to-more-revenues-85012.html.  
 242. Bob Woodward, Inside Story of Obama’s Struggle to Keep Congress from Controlling Outcome of Debt 
Ceiling Crisis, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-president-side-
lined/2012/09/08/a463793c-f6db-11e1-8253-3f495ae70650_story.html (identifying the vote as 218-210 in the 
House). 
 243. Under the debt limit increases authorized under the BCA, the government was able to meet all its obliga-
tions until the debt limit required action again in early 2013. A temporary debt limit increase enacted on February 
4, 2013 as the No Budget, No Pay Act of 2013 carried us to mid-October 2013 when the government was shut 
down by virtue of concurrent inaction by Congress on the expired continuing appropriations. No Budget, No Pay 
Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–3, § 2, 127 Stat. 51 (2013). The resolution of that crisis on October 17, 2013 
through the passage of the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014 and the subsequent uneventful debt ceiling 
increase of February 12, 2014, brings the account to the present day. See Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, 
Pub. L. No. 113–46, 127 Stat. 558 (2013); Temporary Debt Limit Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 113–85, 128 Stat. 
1011 (2014). 
 244. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–25, § 201, 125 Stat. 259 (2011) [hereinafter BCA 2011]. 
 245. Id. § 401. 
 246. Id. § 402. 
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would reduce spending across-the-board to achieve the target.247 
The deadlines came and went, Congress did not achieve the cuts, and as a result, the 
sequestration was due to strike January 1, 2013, at the same time as that $400 billion in 
Bush-era tax cuts would expire,248 a situation dubbed, “the fiscal cliff.” Only one day after 
the fiscal cliff, Congress came to a narrow agreement to avert that crisis, passing the Amer-
ican Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (“ATRA”).249 ATRA also enacted the “Doc Fix” while 
extending the Bush tax cuts permanently for all except those with incomes above 
$400,000.250 The spending cuts required by sequestration were delayed by only three 
months, at which point, $85 billion was slashed from federal spending for fiscal year 2013. 
As a result, almost half of federal employees faced unpaid leaves of absence,251 Head Start 
cut 57,000 children from service, needy families lost a month of aid from the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, the Executive Office of Immigration Review cut back on translators, 3.8 
million people receiving emergency unemployment saw benefits slashed, OSHA was 
slated to make 1200 fewer inspections, and Social Security field offices reduced their 
hours.252 
B. BCA Description 
The BCA253 was enacted amid a political impasse, and it sought to achieve budget 
and spending action by setting up two alternative tracks. It established the automatic track 
of sequestration to shrink discretionary spending by $1.2 trillion over a ten-year period,254 
and established a bypass track of a “Supercommittee” charged with a deadline of Novem-
ber 23, 2011255 to strike a global deal achieving a targeted $1.5 trillion deficit reduction 
over the next ten years.256 Special statutized procedures privileging the Supercommittee 
proposal would have assured an up-or-down vote in Congress,257 but if Congress failed to 
                                                        
 247. See generally Dylan Mathews, The Sequester: Absolutely Everything You Could Possibly Need to Know, 
in one FAQ, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/20/the-
sequester-absolutely-everything-you-could-possibly-need-to-know-in-one-faq/.  
 248. JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42700, THE “FISCAL CLIFF”: MACROECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF TAX INCREASES AND SPENDING CUTS (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42700.pdf. 
 249. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013) [hereinafter 
ATRA]. The statutory borrowing limit was separately extended for another three months in late January. 
 250. Certain Medicare cuts included reductions to combat inpatient and managed care severity upcoding, as 
well as reductions for services like radiology and therapy. Jim Hahn, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42944, Medi-
care, Medicaid. and Other Health Provisions in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, 1-2 (Jan. 31, 2013), 
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42944.pdf.  
 251. Lisa Rein, Unions Rally Federal Employees to Appeal Furloughs, WASH. POST (July 22 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/unions-rally-federal-employees-to-appeal-fur-
lough/2013/07/22/fd72097e-f079-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html. 
 252. Darla Cameron, David Fahrenthold, & Lisa Rein, Tracking the Predicted Sequester Impacts, WASH. POST 
(Jul. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/sequestration-federal-agency-update/. 
 253. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, ch. 20, sec. 901a, § 302a, 125 Stat. 240, 
256 [hereinafter BBEDCA amended]. 
 254. Above and beyond the $917 billion already cut by resurrecting § 251 discretionary spending limits in 
BBEDCA amended. 
 255. BCA 2011, supra note 244, § 402(g)(1). 
 256. See id. § 401. 
 257. Id. § 402. The points of order “statutized” here protect the Supercommittee proposal against filibuster, 
amendment, or other delaying motions. See infra text accompanying notes 305–307. 
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achieve at least $1.2 trillion in savings by January 15, 2012,258 then the process reverted 
to automatic sequestration.259 
BCA sequestration has a multi-layered relationship with GRH sequestration. Unlike 
the long-expired GRH section 253 sequestration, BCA sequestration is not tied to deficit 
reduction goals. However, BCA does revive GRH’s section 251 sequestration which oc-
curs in the event of a breach of the discretionary spending targets.260 Under BCA 2011, 
this type of sequestration is referred to as Title I sequestration.261 The new discretionary 
spending targets that are enforceable by this sequester are already set to reduce federal 
spending by roughly $900 billion over the ten-year period FY 2012-2021.262 They pre-
scribe annual discretionary spending growth at roughly two percent a year.263 
In addition, Title IV of BCA also provides for a new sequestration scenario. Specif-
icallym, the scenario described above would be triggered by the failure of Congress to pass 
a Supercommittee global budget deal by January 15, 2012.264 Title IV sequestration oper-
ates by revising the Title I discretionary spending limits and requiring reductions, includ-
ing cuts in direct spending, such that $1.2 trillion more is saved than would be under the 
discretionary spending limits otherwise set forth in Title I.265 Again, sequestration is de-
fined as automatic “cancellation of budgetary resources”266 in non-exempt federal pro-
grams in accordance with a (more-or-less) across-the-board formula.267 
1. Calculating Title I Cuts v. Title IV Cuts 
Title I and Title IV sequestration differ in a number of respects, particularly in terms 
of how security cuts and non-security cuts are defined and calculated, and whether they 
sequester discretionary funds only, as opposed to both discretionary and direct spending. 
Under Title I sequestration, the “security” category is defined as discretionary ap-
propriations associated with agency budgets not only for the Department of Defense, but 
also the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Veterans Affairs, the National 
                                                        
 258. BBEDCA amended, supra note 253, § 251A. 
 259. See Gravelle, supra note 248, at 3. 
 260. BBEDCA amended, supra note 253, § 251(a)(6) (providing that if Congress adjourns in breach, or enacts 
appropriations, including continuing resolutions, that cause “a breach within a category for that year . . . 15 days 
later there shall be a sequestration”). New discretionary spending ceilings are set for FY 2012-FY 2021. These 
are higher than those imposed by the second-track sequestration (Title IV sequestration) triggered by failure of 
the Supercommittee. Finally, while we do not discuss it in depth here, as this sequestration exists independently 
of the BCA, there is a final trigger for sequestration that was independently reauthorized in 2010 and continues 
to operate in the background, namely PAYGO sequestration, Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–139, 
124 Stat. 8 (2010). 
 261. This name is used because the mechanism is outlined in Title I of the BCA 2011 language. 
 262. C. Stephen Redhead, Budget Control Act: The Potential Impact of Sequestration on Health Reform Spend-
ing, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42051, at 10 (May 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42051.pdf.  
 263. Id. 
 264. BBEDCA amended, supra note 253, § 251A. Congress has until December 23, 2011 to pass the Super-
committee deal under the expedited procedures, but the sequester is not actually triggered unless, by those pro-
cedures or otherwise, Congress fails to pass a plan saving $1.2 billion by the January 15, 2012 deadline.  
 265. Id. § 251A(3)(C) (explaining how the discretionary limits would be reduced by a per annum portion of 
$1.2 trillion, adjusted by eighteen percent to account for reduced debt service). 
 266. 2 U.S.C. § 900(c)(2) (2013). 
 267. Stith, supra note 13, at 625. 
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Nuclear Security Administration, the 054 or intelligence account, and Function 150 Funds, 
which concern international affairs.268 However, for Title IV sequestration, the “security” 
category is defined to refer to the Defense Department’s Function 050 Funds alone.269 
Both Title I sequestration and Title IV sequestration are intended to be divided 
across defense (security) and domestic (non-security) spending categories, but the mech-
anism is quite different for each.270 Sequestration eliminates an ostensibly “uniform per-
centage” from each non-exempt account within the breaching category,271 suggesting at 
first glance that the security and non-security categories would be treated equally. But the 
allocation of costs between these two categories also depends on the separation of security 
and non-security spending caps, which would affect the conditions under which a trigger-
ing breach would occur. Even within Title I sequestration, the division of burdens across 
security and non-security categories differs depending on the triggering year. In Title I, 
the FY 2012 and FY 2013 discretionary spending caps are defined separately with respect 
to both discretionary security and discretionary non-security categories, meaning that a 
breach can occur by virtue of excess spending in the security budget alone.272 That security 
spending breach could not be avoided by simply reducing nondefense spending by a con-
comitant sum as it otherwise could if only one overall discretionary limit were established. 
The language of section 251 provides that a breach in either category will be eliminated 
by a sequestration within that category.273 This structure ensures that those who favor de-
fense spending must suffer some reductions under the Title I caps, at least in the first two 
years, and cannot shift or offset by cutting discretionary programs. As we will see, this 
allocative effect is extended if Title IV sequestration is triggered as well. However, under 
Title I alone, for the remaining eight years of the ten-year window until FY 2021, the 
legislation reverts to setting only an overall spending cap, thus permitting the cross-subsi-
dization of defense spending by non-defense discretionary cuts so as to avoid a sequestra-
ble breach.274 
If Congress cannot pass a Supercommittee or alternative grand compromise by the 
deadline, thereby triggering Title IV sequestration, the discretionary spending limits are 
revised such that the spending cap for every year in the ten-year window is divided into 
security and non-security.275 Again, certain members of Congress may have intended this 
                                                        
 268. See BBEDCA amended, supra note 253, § 250(c)(4)(B). 
 269. Compare id. (defining “security” under Title I as “includ[ing] discretionary appropriations associated 
with agency budgets for the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Veterans Affairs, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the intelligence community management ac-
count (98-0401-0-1-054), and all budget accounts in budget function 150 (international affairs.).”); with id. § 
251A(4) (defining “revised security category” under Title IV as “discretionary appropriations in budget function 
050.”). To be precise, the 050 account includes not just Defense Department funds, but also some spending by 
other agencies, such as the Department of Energy and the FBI. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
14-452 (2013); SEQUESTRATION: SELECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES REDUCED SOME SERVICES AND INVESTMENTS, 
WHILE TAKING SHORT-TERM ACTIONS TO MITIGATE EFFECTS 6 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/prod-
ucts/GAO-14-452.  
 270. BBEDCA amended, supra note 253, §250(c)(4)(B). 
 271. Id. § 251(a)(2).  
 272. Id. § 251(c)(1)–(2).  
 273. Id. § 251(a)(1). 
 274. Id. § 251(c)(3)–(10). 
 275. Id. § 251A(2). 
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consequence to “penalize” the supporters of defense spending and induce them to partici-
pate in a “grand compromise.” Defense proponents suffer additional consequences under 
Title IV arising from the “revised” definition of the “security” spending category. For in-
stance, in 2013, when even the Title I spending cap had been divided into security and 
non-security components, triggering the overlay of Title IV would not only reduce the 
security-related discretionary spending limit from $686 billion to $546 billion (presumably 
to account for the fact that the security spending allocation now only covers the Defense 
Department’s Function 050 account), but it would also render the 050 account the sole 
source of any cuts to eliminate breaches of the security cap. In other words, under Title IV 
sequestration, defense spending needs can no longer be absorbed or spread across other 
arguably security-related programs and must therefore observe strict spending limits. 
For Title IV sequestration, both mandatory and discretionary resources are subject 
to cancellation.276 The amount to be cancelled is set at $1.2 trillion, divided over the ten-
year period.277 Each year, the formula splits the annualized cuts into a security and non-
security component dictated by the relative proportion between the two established by the 
revised discretionary spending limits listed in the statute.278 The formula then divides the 
security cuts and non-security cuts each into their “discretionary spending” and “direct 
spending” components.279 The subdivision of required savings between discretionary and 
direct spending in each category is calculated in proportion to the ratio that the discretion-
ary spending, as limited by BCA, bears to the Administration’s estimate of nonexempt 
direct spending outlays in that category.280 This ratio is calculated for both the security 
category and the non-security category, as the proportion differs for each.281 
Title IV encodes a number of policies. On the one hand, it is revising “discretionary 
spending limits,” signaling that appropriators should reduce discretionary spending below 
the prescribed amounts. On the other hand, it is allocating the required spending reductions 
to both discretionary and direct spending categories. Title I targets discretionary spending 
alone, while Title IV ratchets down direct—i.e. entitlement spending—as well. 
Cancelled budget resources are returned to the general fund, or in the case of ex-
penditures that draw from designated trust funds, returned to those funds.282 
                                                        
 276. Id. § 251A(3)–(10) (stipulating how to calculate the total reduction required and how to allocate that total 
reduction to discretionary and direct spending accounts in defense and nondefense functions  as well as how to 
implement those allocated reductions). 
 277. Id. § 251A. 
 278. Id. § 251A(2). 
 279. Id. § 250(c)(8) (defining direct spending as the “budget authority provided by law other than appropriation 
Acts, entitlement authority, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, formerly “the food stamp pro-
gram”). 
 280. Id. § 251A(5)–(6) (dividing the mandatory and discretionary spending for security and non-security cat-
egories. This ratio presumably ratchets down entitlement spending because the excess discretionary spending 
that triggers the breach means that the discretionary spending exceeds what is prescribed by the BCA discretion-
ary spending limits. Yet the ratio of prescribed cuts assumes that discretionary spending relative to mandatory 
spending is less than what it in reality turned out to be). 
 281. Id. § 251A(8). 
 282. Stith, supra note 13, at 625 n.192. 
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2. Exceptions 
The BCA also specifies a large number of exceptions, many carried over from GRH, 
which left “approximately seventy percent of the budget immune from sequestration.”283 
The President can, and has in Fiscal Year 2013, exempted military personnel ac-
counts from the sequester.284 This exemption must be paid for by further reductions within 
subfunction 051, which covers other military spending, meaning that no other subaccounts 
can subsidize this exception.285  
“Low-income” programs, if arguably disadvantaged in the fight over post-sequester 
piecemeal “fixes,” are actually well represented among the programs exempted from se-
questration. Exempt programs include the school lunch, the school breakfast, but not the 
special milk program. Other exempted low-income programs include the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
both of which are funded through block grants to states. Meanwhile certain mandatory 
programs for low-income groups are also exempt, such as Medicaid, food stamps (now 
known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)), Social Security In-
come (SSI), and the mandatory piece of the Child Support Enforcement Program.286 In 
addition, foster care and Pell grants are exempted, as are certain special economic recovery 
programs, including GSE Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, the Office of Financial 
Stability, and the Special IG for the Troubled Asset Relief Program.287 
Many accounts related to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are exempt as 
are housing finance accounts, including those for Fannie and Freddie Mac. Many retire-
ment contributions that the government has obliged itself to make are exempt, as are Arti-
cle III judges’ salaries. Similarly, certain “prior legal obligations” of the federal govern-
ment in specified budget accounts, such as that of the subsidized Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation Fund, are exempt, as are all programs under the Veterans Administration.288 
Apart from the specially designated exemptions, there are other loopholes through 
which spending could escape sequestration. Under section 251(b)(2)(A), Congress can 
override the sequester by designating an item as emergency appropriations or appropria-
tions for the “war on terror.”289 The statute tries to minimize the abuse of this loophole by 
defining the term “emergency” as “a situation that requires new budget authority and out-
lays . . . for the prevention or mitigation of, or response to, loss of life, or property, or a 
threat to national security; and is unanticipated.”290 Unanticipated in the context of section 
251 is further specified to mean “[s]udden . . . urgent . . . unforeseen . . . [and] tempo-
rary.”291 The statute even goes on to define each of these terms. 
                                                        
 283. Dodge, supra note 160, at 861. 
 284. BBEDCA amended, supra note 253, § 255(f)(1). 
 285. Id. § 251(a). 
 286. Id. § 255. 
 287. Karen Spar, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42050, Budget “Sequestration” and Selected Program Exemp-
tions and Special Rules, at 9 (June 13, 2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42050.pdf. 
 288. Id. 
 289. BBEDCA amended, supra note 253, § 251(b)(2(A).  
 290. Id. §§ 250(c)(20)(A)–(B), 250(21). 
 291. Id. § 250(c).   
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Medicare had always been protected under GRH sequestration from cuts above a 
certain percentage.292 BCA accordingly limits Medicare cuts to a level no greater than two 
percent.293 The March 2013 sequester was calculated to require nondefense mandatory 
spending reductions of 5.1 percent.294 Thus, mandatory Medicare spending is significantly 
protected by the two percent ceiling. The shortfall in non-security savings that results from 
this cap on Medicare cuts must be offset by slashing other non-security programs even 
more deeply, again prohibiting cross-subsidization between security and non-security pro-
grams.295 In addition, certain Medicare spending is entirely exempt from even the two 
percent sequestration. These exemptions include low-income subsidies for the prescription 
drug benefits above the catastrophic limit, and outpatient coverage (Part B) premium, sub-
sidies the government pays on behalf of individuals between 120–135 percent of FPL.296 
Spending on Medicare beneficiaries with even lower incomes, so-called dual eligibles 
(qualifying for Medicaid as well as Medicare), is also entirely protected from sequestration 
under the auspices of the Medicaid exemption.297 
Community and migrant health centers are also protected from sequestration cuts 
beyond two percent.298 These funds have not always been categorized as mandatory spend-
ing, but the 2010 health reform law gave them direct spending status from Fiscal Year 
2011 to 2015. Indian Health Service (IHS) funds however, can be fully sequestered, except 
for the small amount of IHS funding that is classified as mandatory and is intended for 
diabetes care. Such cuts are capped at two percent.299 
The policies encoded by these exceptions stand in tension with those represented by 
the Title IV allocation of reductions. While Title IV aims to cut entitlement spending, the 
exceptions also protect some of that entitlement spending. And of course, both the GRH 
and the BCA sequesters entirely exempt tax expenditures.300 
3. Hallmarks of Precommitment 
The BCA bears hallmarks of an intentional act of self-binding by Congress. First, 
Congress is precommitting in the same manner that it did through the sequester enacted 
under GRH.301 According to this revived mechanism, Title I sequestration is triggered 
when Congress spends beyond the discretionary limits set in BCA 2011. Thus Congress 
has predetermined that certain consequences will attach to “excessive” spending at time 
two. 
Additionally, BCA changes the incentives to strike a budget deal at time two through 
                                                        
 292. However, these exemptions apply only to mandatory Medicare spending. Some Medicare spending, such 
as administrative costs, is discretionary. See BBEDCA amended, supra note 253, § 256(d)(1) (imposing the cuts 
as a reduction of payments for services offered in the sequestration time period). 
 293. Id. § 256(d) (this section was held over from GRH). See also id. § 251A(8). 
 294. Spar, supra note 287, at 12. 
 295. BBEDCA amended, supra note 253, § 251A(9). 
 296. Spar, supra note 287, at 8–9.  
 297. Id. at 12.  
 298. BBEDCA amended, supra note 253, § 256(e). 
 299. Id. § 256 (e)(1). 
 300. Dodge, supra note 160, at 845.  
 301. See supra text accompanying notes 136–39. 
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the new Title IV sequestration mechanism. However, the valence of the incentive change 
is different for different members of Congress. Michael Dorf has commented on how the 
sequestration should be understood as a penalty default,302 which Ian Ayres and Robert 
Gertner have famously defined for the contract law arena as an objectionable default term 
that induces parties to contract for more desirable substitute terms.303 As a penalty default, 
the sequestration should have made a comprehensive budget and spending deal, through 
the Supercommittee or otherwise, more likely at time two, because the presumably un-
wanted costs of not achieving such a deal are heightened by the sequester. However, be-
cause some members of Congress may wish to strangle government by dramatically re-
stricting federal spending, the sequester is to them a “majoritarian” default, or a provision 
that accurately captures the desired result.304 Thus for those members, the sequester re-
duces the cost of not achieving a grand budget deal. Of course this discussion assumes that 
the sequester is binding at time two and cannot be set aside by Congress without formal 
obstacle. This assumption is challenged in our previous and later discussion. 
The BCA is also riddled with other ostensible precommitment devices. In BCA 
2011, Congress bound itself to vote on the Supercommittee recommendation without fili-
buster,305 without amendment,306 and without any delaying motions, such as multiple 
quorum calls, motions to recommit, reconsider, postpone, or proceed to other business.307 
These motions are subject to points of order, which can presumably be waived, suspended, 
or appealed from a ruling of the chair, all in the usual fashion, requiring only ordinary 
majorities. These fast-track statutized rules are also enacted with the boilerplate disclaimer 
language.308 Thus if there were majority support for any substantive amendment to the 
Supercommittee recommendation, presumably a majority could also be mustered to 
change the rules to permit such an amendment.309 
Finally, the BCA legislation, apart from the Supercommittee and sequester provi-
sions, includes a number of other features with deep familial resemblance to the types of 
laws we have been examining. Title II includes a promise of a vote on a Balanced Budget 
constitutional amendment.310 In raising the debt ceiling, BCA also employs recusal dele-
gation insofar as it leaves the decision of when to raise the debt limit ceiling, at least for 
the next $900 billion increase, to the President. This hike would automatically go into 
effect. However, within a fifty-day period after the President certifies such a debt limit 
                                                        
 302. Michael Dorf, So Much for Sequester Leverage, DORF ON LAW (Apr. 29, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/04/so-much-for-sequester-leverage.html. 
 303. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 91 (1989). 
 304. John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 825, 840–41 (2006). 
 305. BCA 2011, supra note 244, §§ 402(c)(2)–(3) (after 2 days and no more than 30 hours of debate).  
 306. Id. § 402(d). 
 307. Id. §§ 402(a)–(e).  
 308. Id. § 404 (applying to all provisions of “this Title,” presumably referring to Title IV, entitled, “Joint Select 
Committee on Deficit Reduction”). 
 309. This claim of majority sufficiency assumes that cloture rule is itself able to be overcome by the nuclear 
option. 
 310. BCA 2011, supra note 244, § 201. 
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increase, Congress could overrule $500 billion of that amount with a joint resolution.311 
The joint resolution is protected from points of order, filibuster, amendment, and other 
delaying maneuvers. A similar delegation allows the President to decide if the debt limit 
needs to be raised by another $1.2 trillion, but such action would also be fully subject to 
Congressional joint resolution. By this arrangement, as with the BRAC legislation, Con-
gress is relieved from having to vote affirmatively for something unattractive, namely, to 
raise the debt ceiling. Finally, the $1.2 trillion increase could be expanded to a $1.5 trillion 
increase by way of the Supercommittee reaching a deal, or submitting a proposal for a 
Balanced Budget amendment to the Constitution to the states for ratification.312 
4. Weak Precommitment 
Posner and Vermeule have argued that the budget precommitment mechanisms, in-
cluding the GRH sequester, are pseudo-entrenching statutes.313 Nevertheless, under the 
broader precommitment rubric, we can still ask: is it an act that professes to make the 
choice of some option at time two more difficult? It appears that Congress meant for it to 
operate in such a fashion: the sequester ostensibly subjects the choice of spending beyond 
the discretionary limits, or the outcome of failing to reach a Supercommittee deal, to a 
particular consequence.  
However, is there any actual barrier to Congress changing its mind at time two and 
just deciding to set aside the punitive consequence? Dodge criticizes BCA and GRH alike 
as ineffective in their attempts to restrain Congress in the future.314 Any Member who 
wishes to act in contravention of the BCA need only muster the support in Congress to 
waive, suspend, change the parameters, or even change the critical statutory language re-
quiring the President to order sequestration upon breach in order to achieve their policy 
objective. 
Because the support needed to pass such changes to the BCA is not necessarily—
and certainly not by virtue of the BCA—different from the level of support needed to pass 
the first-order policy, BCA should be easy to circumvent. Indeed the statutized rules priv-
ileging the Supercommittee’s work are expressly subject to change by simple majority of 
any given house of Congress because of the boilerplate “disclaimer” language.315 Moreo-
ver, the Congressional Research Service suggests that through some error of enumeration, 
the points of order enforcing section 314(f), prohibiting consideration in the House or Sen-
ate of legislation that exceeds the discretionary spending limits, are waivable by simple 
majority rather than three-fifths of the Senate.316 
                                                        
 311. Id. § 301 (codified as 31 USC §§ 3101A(a)–(b)). 
 312. Id. § 301 (codified as 31 USC §§ 3101A(a)(2)((A)(ii)–(iii)). 
 313. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1695. 
 314. Dodge, supra note 160, at 855.  
 315. See supra text accompanying notes 305–40. 
 316. James V. Saturno, Points of Order in the Congressional Budget Process, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-
865, at 9 (July 11, 2013), available at http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-pub-
lish.cfm?pid=%26*2%404RLC%3E%0A. 
This provision previously appeared at § 314(e) [of the amended Balanced Budget and 
Deficit Control Act of 1985], but was redesignated as § 314(f) under P.L. 112-78. The 
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But even GRH, which on its face managed to apply supermajority points of order to 
spending above the discretionary limits, achieved only “pseudo-entrenchment” because 
the supermajority points of order were not themselves protected from majority repeal.317 
Kate Stith does observe of GRH sequestration, and thus by logical extension BCA seques-
tration, that automatic spending cuts require “a future Congress to act twice, in effect, in 
order to undo one previous legislative enactment.”318 In other words, Congress must enact 
the desired GRH nonconforming policy, and act to legislatively amend or repeal the con-
straints of the GRH. The reason that the requirement of acting “twice” is not particularly 
meaningful as a device is that the two changes—the first-order policy change desired, and 
the second-order procedural change to the BCA permitting such a policy change—could 
be rolled into one bill which could be passed according to the ordinary rules. The existence 
of points of order does not prevent these two steps from taking place together with only 
ordinary majorities.319 This is weak entrenchment at best, relying simply on the current 
norms or political winds; the majority while not barred from changing the caps, might not 
be willing to withstand the political consequences of overriding GRH.320 As we have seen 
in our discussion, any other example of entrenchment is subject to the same problem; the 
only real cost is political. 
Why all the indicia of entrenchment then? This paper argues that these efforts exist 
to prompt the political consequences by means of appealing to the false necessity of legal-
ism. The binding quality comes from wishful “half-belief.” 
5. Sequestration: An Example of Legalism 
Sequestration is therefore an example of Congress resorting to legalism as a maneu-
ver to legitimize its spending choices. Sequestration was not the goal expressed by the 
sponsors of GRH, but instead was a fallback for the true aim, which was to constitutional-
ize a balanced budget. Short of that, Senator Gramm said that GRH was “the strongest 
provision[] that [could] be written in statute to force fulfillment of that promise made long 
ago that we balance the budget.”321 Kate Stith says that “GRH’s strongest proponents 
clearly would have preferred a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution.”322 Indeed 
                                                        
waiver threshold for this point of order was originally established as three-fifths of Sena-
tors ‘duly chosen and sworn.’ When the section was designated, however, the waiver 
threshold that appears in § 904(c) [of the Congressional Budget Act] was not amended to 
match this redesignation. Consequently, it appears that the simple majority threshold for 
waivers that appears in § 904(b) would now apply. 
Id. 
 317. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1696. 
 318. Stith, supra note 13, at 659. 
 319. Again, assuming the availability of the nuclear option against filibuster. 
 320. Paul Kahn, Gramm Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 185, 205 (1985). 
 321. 131 CONG. REC. S12568 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1985) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm). 
 322. Stith, supra note 13, at 624 n.190.  
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she calls the regime of GRH a building block in the architecture of “the fiscal constitu-
tion.”323 Another form of law that pre-exists is precedent,324 and Congress’ 2011 resusci-
tation of sequestration, which had already been used in a previous budget deficit struggle 
in the mid-1980’s, benefits from the aura of precedent. The cuts prescribed by sequestra-
tion are distributed by an across-the-board formula, which admits of little discretion. Se-
questration as a tool is therefore in the spirit of Congress trying to submit itself to already-
binding law, “applying only norms already valid.”325 It is thus a classic example of legal-
ism. 
Sequestration also relies upon a disavowal of politics. It takes advantage of a veil of 
ignorance, allowing Members to support spending cuts and fiscal discipline in general, 
while ostensibly distancing themselves from the particular choice of programs to harm, 
beneficiaries to suffer, and employees to fire. It “encourages legislators to claim initial 
credit for passing the BCA and then avoid difficult compromises down the road.”326 With 
some immediate cuts, they can procrastinate on the politically riskiest decisions.327 “Se-
questration . . . still allows Congress to avoid blame for spending cuts. . . .”328 
IV: IPAB 
A. The Political Context of IPAB 
Medicare, the program providing medical assistance to mostly elderly and disabled 
recipients who have qualified through their participation in the workforce, is an entitlement 
program whose expenditures have long fluctuated independently of Congressional appro-
priations. Medicare’s spending on inpatient care, namely Part A, draws from dedicated 
trust fund accounts stocked by current workers’ payroll tax contributions.329 Roughly one-
quarter of Medicare Part B spending, primarily covering physician care, is also paid for by 
dedicated trust funds, with the rest financed by general tax revenue.330 
IPAB is a new independent agency created by the health reform law331 to devise 
Medicare cuts that keep program growth to a target rate.332 Anytime Medicare exceeds that 
                                                        
 323. See id.  
 324. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 181–87 (1991). 
 325. MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 74 (Max Rheinstein, ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein, 
transl., Harvard Univ. Press 1954) (1925). 
 326. Dodge, supra note 160, at 862. 
 327. Id. at 863. 
 328. Id. 
 329. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 562 (1995). 
 330. Dodge, supra note 160, at 823.   
 331. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119-1025 (as 
amended by the Health Care Education and Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029, codified 
as amended at scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code and in 42 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., and 20 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter PPACA]. IPAB was among the amendments PPACA made to the Social Security Act, as codified in 
42 U.S.C. Rather than using the PPACA section designations, or the sections references in the U.S. Code, I will 
refer to IPAB provisions using the relevant section designations in the Social Security Act [hereinafter SSA]. 
 332. The limit is the average of general urban CPI and medical CPI in the first years IPAB takes effect. It is 
GDP + 1% in later years. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(c)(6)(C)(ii) (2010) (as amended by § 3403 of PPACA). 
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target, IPAB will propose Medicare spending cuts that would go into effect unless Con-
gress passes an alternative that achieves equivalent savings.333 The authorizing statute pro-
vides that the automatic implementation and the requirements for consideration of Con-
gress’ alternative can only be waived, changed, or repealed by a three-fifths majority. 
Indeed repeal of the automatic character of IPAB’s proposals, or of the narrow parameters 
by which Congress can substitute for those proposals, is apparently restricted to a joint 
resolution of disapproval that can only be considered and passed within a seven-month 
span of 2017, must receive an up-or-down vote under expedited procedures, and requires 
three-fifths to pass.334 
Because IPAB was part of the highly polarizing health reform package,335 it was 
enacted without any Republican support. But IPAB actually has a precursor enacted in a 
Republican-led proposal that many Democrats opposed.336 President George W. Bush’s 
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) instituted a “trigger” mechanism that would 
require the President to submit Medicare-cutting proposals to Congress, and allow Con-
gress to consider such proposals under expedited procedures anytime two successive Med-
icare trustees’ reports showed that general revenue (rather than dedicated trust fund/payroll 
tax revenue) would constitute forty-five percent or more of Medicare outlays within the 
upcoming six-year horizon.337 These triggers were called Medicare funding warnings. The 
proposals generated by these warnings however would not go into effect automatically, 
nor did any portion of the language instituting this mechanism claim to be insulated from 
change by future Congresses. And indeed, on two of the six occasions when the warning 
was triggered, the House of Representatives adopted a simple unicameral resolution de-
claring the expedited procedures in section 803 of the MMA inapplicable.338 
The funding warnings were also rendered ineffective in the other instances in which 
they were triggered because on those occasions, the President invoked the Recommenda-
tions Clause of the Constitution to declare that Congress could only suggest, and not re-
quire, that he submit legislation. The President argued that to submit legislation, the Pres-
ident himself had to regard such legislation as necessary and expedient. President Bush 
indeed originally articulated this objection in a signing statement when the bill was first 
passed December 8, 2003.339 
                                                        
 333. There are a few other conditions that could interrupt this sequence explained infra text accompanying 
notes 360, 378–86. I also explain there that Congress’ ability to pass an alternative will expire in 2020 under the 
current terms of the legislation.  
 334. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(f)(2)(F) (2010). 
 335. House Republicans have voted 41 times to repeal PPACA. See Morgan Whitaker, For 41st Time, GOP 
Votes Against Obamacare, MSNBC (Oct. 2, 2013, 10:03 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/09/12/here-we-go-
again-for-41st-time-gop-votes-against-obamacare/. 
 336. The Ryan-Wyden Medicare voucherization proposal also included the idea of limiting Medicare growth 
to GDP plus one, but the details of the plan as released were far too limited to extrapolate what that would mean 
as a policy See, e.g., Austin Frakt, What does a GPD + 1growth cap mean?, THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Apr. 
26, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/what-does-a-gdp1-growth-cap-mean/. 
 337. H.R. 1, 118th Cong. (2003).   
 338. H. Res. 1368 (July 24, 2008) (applying to the 110th Congress); and H. Res. 5 (Jan. 6, 2009). 
 339. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improve-
ment, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Dec. 8, 2003), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/pdf/PPP-
2003-book2-doc-pg1698.pdf; President Barack Obama, Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act 
of 2009 (Mar. 11,  2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2009-book1/pdf/PPP-2009-book1-Doc-pg216.pdf 
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The IPAB legislation can be understood as a lineal descendant of the funding warn-
ings provision. The IPAB measure represents an effort to tie Medicare spending controls 
to a more politically salient trigger—Medicare spending growth relative to general infla-
tion or GDP growth. It further allows IPAB’s reports to be presented directly to Congress, 
and not solely through the President, obviating the Recommendations Clause concerns. 
The idea was originally proposed by Senators Jay Rockefeller and Sheldon Whitehouse as 
S. 1380 in the 111th Congress.340 The original notion of the legislation was to take the 
current advisory committee to Congress on Medicare payments, the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Committee (MedPAC) and convert it into an independent executive branch 
agency, and enable its recommendations to take on binding force. The idea quickly at-
tracted the support of President Obama.341 Though many Democrats opposed the idea—
and oppose it still342—the provision was included in the health reform bill, and touted by 
the President and his budget advisors as a key element of the health reform bill’s strategy 
to “bend the cost curve.”343  
IPAB met with a firestorm of controversy. During the debate leading up to health 
reform, IPAB was associated with the threat of government death panels that would deny 
health care to elderly and disabled individuals.344 Even after the bill became law, IPAB 
remained a focus of obstruction. The House of Representatives has tried to repeal IPAB 
specifically,345 garnering 223 votes in favor and 181 opposing. The House has also voted 
forty-one times to repeal the health reform law entirely, including the IPAB provision.346 
House and Senate Republicans have refused to submit nominees themselves, while prom-
ising to block the confirmation of any others who would get nominated to the Board.347 
The Goldwater Institute has launched an advocacy campaign against what it calls “an au-
thoritarian super-legislature,” saying “IPAB may be the most anti-constitutional measure 
ever to pass Congress.”348 The Institute’s litigation arm also represented plaintiffs in filing 
a lawsuit, Coons v. Geithner, challenging IPAB’s constitutionality based, among other 
things, on improper delegation. Some of the counts were dismissed following the Supreme 
                                                        
(declaring that “because the Constitution gives the President the discretion to recommend only ‘such measures 
as he shall judge necessary and expedient,’. . . I shall treat these directions as precatory”). 
 340. Originally, S. 1110, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 341. Id. 
 342. See H.R. 351, 113th Cong. (2013) (introduced by Rep. Allyson Schwartz and Rep. David Roe to repeal 
IPAB). See also 156 CONG. REC. H1913 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Stark). Sen. Mark Pryor 
has co-sponsored the IPAB repeal bill in the Senate, S. 351, 113th Cong. (2013).  
 343. Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and Cost Control, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
PERSP. 601, 601–02 (2010). 
 344. Peter Ubel, Why it is so Difficult to Kill the Death Panel Myth, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2013, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2013/01/09/why-it-is-so-difficult-to-kill-the-death-panel-myth/. 
 345. Pete Kasperowicz, House Approves Repeal of Cost-Cutting Healthcare Board, THE HILL (Mar. 22, 2012, 
4:13 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/217583-house-passes-health-board-repeal-medical-tort-
reform-bill.  
 346. See Whitaker, supra note 335. 
 347. John A. Boehner, Letter to the President from the Speaker of the House (May, 09, 2013), available at 
http://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/documents/05-09-2013_letter_to_president.pdf. 
 348. Diane Cohen & Michael Cannon, CATO INSTITUTE, The Independent Payment Advisory Board: PPACA’s 
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Court’s 2012 decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, all remaining counts were dismissed December 
19, 2012, and on appeal, the Ninth Circuit ordered dismissal, declaring the matter un-
ripe.349 
B. IPAB Description 
1. The Trigger: SSA Section 1899A(c)(6) 
In section 1899A(c)(6) of the SSA, the IPAB legislation specifies a trigger activating 
a chain of duties. The trigger is a critical control point in the process envisioned by the 
legislation. Thus, IPAB does not send a proposal to the President and Congress,350 starting 
the cascade of other consequences351 unless the triggering growth conditions are satisfied. 
The determination of the growth numbers must occur by April 15 of each year. HHS’s 
Chief Actuary trips the wire if she determines that the projected per capita Medicare 
growth rate352 for the implementation year353 will exceed the target growth rate.354 The 
“implementation year” is defined as two years from the year in which the triggering deter-
mination is made,355 which in turn is called the “determination year.” The year sandwiched 
in between the determination year and the implementation year is called the “proposal 
year,” indicating that it is the year in which the proposal is laid before Congress prior to 
automatic implementation in August of that year.356 
The target growth rate is defined in (c)(7)(B) according to two different formulae.357 
In early years, it is the mean of CPI-urban and the medical expenditure component of CPI-
urban. In determination years—2018 and beyond—the target growth rate is per capita 
GDP-plus-one.358 The projected per capita Medicare growth rate is also further specified. 
The rate by which Medicare growth is measured is not a one-year rate but the average for 
the five-year period ending in the implementation year. Notably the trigger depends heav-
ily on projection, rather than on purely retrospective data regarding actual Medicare spend-
ing.359 
There are certain “escape hatch” scenarios under which the trigger is arrested, for 
instance if medical CPI is less than overall CPI.360 In more limited instances, when per 
                                                        
 349. See Coons v. Geithner, No. CV-10-1714-PHX-GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 2012).  
On appeal, the challenge to IPAB was further deemed unripe by the Ninth Circuit, which remanded to the District 
Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, rather than reaching the merits. Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, Coons v. Lew, 2015 WL 1400867 (Mar. 30, 2015). 
 350. SSA § 1899A(c)(3)(A)(ii). Although the Board submits advisory reports under § 1899A(c)(1) as well, 
the language expressly excludes those reports from the rules for congressional consideration under § 1899A(d).  
 351. Id. § 1899A(c)(4) (providing that when the President receives such a proposal either from IPAB or HHS 
under § 1899A(c)(5), he must submit it to Congress).  
 352. Id. § 1899A(c)(6)(B).  
 353. The implementation year is “the second year following the determination year.” Id. § 1899A(b)(1). 
 354. Id. §1899A(c)(6)(C). 
 355. Id. § 1899A(b)(2). 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. § 1395kkk(c)(7)(B).  
 358. Id. § 1395kkk (c)(6)(C). 
 359. Projected deficits rather than actual deficit numbers proved highly manipulable in the GRH sequestration 
context. 
 360. Id. §§ 1899A(c)(3)(A)(ii)(II) & (III). 
50
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss3/2
HO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2015  3:20 PM 
2015] BUDGETING ON AUTOPILOT 745 
capita national health expenditure (NHE) growth exceeds per capita Medicare growth, the 
trigger itself is not arrested, but automatic implementation is. 
2. The Proposal: Section 1899A(c) 
Upon the actuary’s triggering determination in April of any year, IPAB must pro-
pose,361 and then transmit to the President and Congress by January 15 of the following 
year,362 a set of cost-cutting measures363 sufficient to achieve target savings.364 Simplifying 
slightly, this condition means that those cuts must bring that year’s Medicare per capita 
spending within GDP-plus-one.365 However, one complication of the way in which the 
requirement is drafted is that the savings must be achieved for the implementation year, 
though the excess growth is calculated based on a five-year growth average. 
The legislation further specifies the parameters of those proposals,366 including pos-
itive instructions to include cuts to Medicare Advantage and prescription drug payments, 
and negative instructions never to ration, restrict benefits, raise revenues or premiums, 
increase cost-sharing, or change eligibility.367 The proposal must also include identifica-
tion of the appropriations the government requires to implement the measures contained.368 
Other language stipulates no increase over a ten-year window, which excludes pro-
posals that achieve upfront savings in the implementation year at the expense of increasing 
spending in the out-years.369  
Finally, if for any reason IPAB fails to transmit a proposal even when triggered to 
do so, the Secretary of HHS will fill in.370 
3. Congressional Consideration: Section 1899A(d) 
Once the proposal has been submitted to Congress, the special rules outlined in sec-
tion 1899A(d) govern Congress’ actions on that proposal. The bill employs a variety of 
streamlined procedures to privilege the consideration of this proposal.371 It must be intro-
duced and referred to specified committees, whose jurisdictions are enlarged to consider 
the proposal as a whole.372 It must then be discharged from committee if the committee 
                                                        
 361. Id. § 1899A(c)(2). 
 362. Id. § 1899A(c)(3). 
 363. Id. § 1899A(c)(2)(A). 
 364. Id. § 1899A(c)(2)(A)(i). 
 365. The simplification I made above is that I do not mention there will be a sliding upper limit to cuts. Thus 
by the time IPAB is fully phased in, in 2018, the cuts never exceed 1.5% of total Medicare spending. Id. § 
1899A(c)(7)(C)(i). 
 366. Id. §§ 1899A(c)(2)(A)(ii)–(vi), 1899A(c)(2)(B)–(C) (detailing additional considerations). 
 367. Until proposal year 2019 (for implementation year 2020), proposals cannot decrease hospital and hospice 
inflationary updates as a means of cutting costs. Id. § 1899A(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
 368. Id. § 1899A(c)(2)(A)(v). 
 369. This language anticipates and prevents the type of budget manipulation such as those in FY 1989, when 
Congress scheduled a military payday one day later in order to have it count against a new fiscal year. Dodge, 
supra note 160, at 851. 
 370. SSA § 1899A(c)(5). 
 371. Id. § 1899A(d)(4). 
 372. Id. §§ 1899A(d)(1)(C)–(D), 1899A(d)(2)(c). 
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has not reported out the legislation by April 1 of the proposal year. The expedited proce-
dures in Congress for debating and considering the proposal include imposing points of 
order limiting amendments to only those that are germane and do not breach the applicable 
savings target.373 Senate debate, which is otherwise difficult to terminate because of the 
filibuster rule, is here specifically limited to a 30-10-1 framework, which means thirty 
hours of debate afforded to the measure overall, ten for the conference report, and one for 
amendments or motions.374 Delaying procedural motions are tightly restricted. These statu-
tized rules are protected against waiver or appeal from the chair ruling without a three-
fifths majority, discussed further infra.375 As with any other legislation, the President can 
veto Congress’ amended version of the proposal, subject to a two-thirds override.376 
4. Automatic Implementation: Section 1899A(e) 
In the years leading up to 2019, if Congress does not succeed in passing substitute 
savings measures by August 15 of the proposal year, the Secretary will automatically im-
plement IPAB’s proposal.377 For Congress’ substitute to be effective in heading off the 
Secretary’s automatic implementation, it must bear the following language: “This Act su-
persedes the recommendations of the Board contained in the proposal submitted . . . to 
Congress under section 1899A of the Social Security Act.”378 
Automatic implementation cannot be headed off by a Congressional substitute in 
proposal year 2019. In other words, implementation year 2019 would be the last year for 
which Congressional substitution in the prior year would have been possible without fur-
ther action.379 Thus, according to section 1899A(e), in implementation year 2020 and be-
yond, implementation would ostensibly only be curtailed  if Congress had in the meantime 
discontinued the Board a certain way.380 That way is specified as a particular Joint Reso-
lution that is subject to certain burdens on passage.381 It can only be introduced in January 
of 2017,382 and it is subject to debate limitations of ten hours,383 with a three-fifths majority 
required for passage.384 Moreover, to be effective in halting automatic implementation in 
implementation year 2020, it must pass by August 15, 2017.385 This language (regarding 
                                                        
 373. Id. §§ 1899A (d)(3)(A)(ii)–(iv). However, in §§ 1899A(d)(4)(B)(iv)–(v), such amendments would be 
subject to a point of order that could only be waived or suspended by three-fifths in the Senate, as would be 
required for appeals from rulings of the chair. One interesting point is whether CMS OACT, rather than CBO 
would be the scorekeeper now for the amendments and their conformance to the savings target. 
 374. Id. §§ 1899A(d)(4)(D)(iv)–(E). 
 375. See supra text accompanying note 351. 
 376. SSA § 1899A(d)(3)(F). But then presumably the veto could be overridden by two-thirds vote of Con-
gress). FURROW, supra note 329, at 799. Some have speculated that the President could not only veto if Congress 
affirmatively votes to approve the IPAB proposal, but even if the proposal takes effect without Congress’ action. 
See Fox, supra note 202, at 159. 
 377. SSA § 1899A(e). 
 378. Id. § 1899A(e)(3)(A). 
 379. Id. § 1899(A)(e)(3)(B)(i). 
 380. Or at least certain features relating to the Board. 
 381. Id. § 1899A(f)(1). 
 382. Id. § 1899A(f)(1)(A). 
 383. Id. § 1899A(f)(1)(C)(ii). 
 384. Id. § 1899A(f)(1)(F). 
 385. Id. § 1899A(e)(3)(A)(ii). 
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the need for a joint resolution to discontinue the requirement of automatic implementation 
in order to allow Congress to continue to arrest automatic implementation by passing a 
substitute in 2020 and beyond) might appear nonsensical on its face. After all, how could 
a Congressional substitute for a proposal short-circuit automatic implementation if auto-
matic implementation had already been repealed by Congress? However, one reading is 
that Congress merely meant to say that for implementation year 2020 and beyond, Con-
gress’ powers to intervene with the proposal’s automatic implementation are reduced even 
further, unless of course Congress intends to disable automatic implementation entirely. 
In all years, there is a limited third method of interrupting the automatic implemen-
tation of the proposal. That method arises if per capita NHE growth exceeds per capita 
Medicare growth.386 This interruption, however, is restricted in its application. It cannot 
be used two years in a row, and it does not absolve the Board of its post-trigger duties to 
make its proposal and transmit that proposal to Congress, nor Congress of its role in con-
sidering that proposal.387 
5. Preclusion of Review: Section 1899(e)(5) 
The proposal’s automatic effect is protected even further by the statutory language 
precluding judicial or administrative review of “the implementation by the Secretary under 
this subsection of the recommendations contained in a proposal.”388  
The language specifically cites review under SSA sections 1869 and 1878 as pre-
cluded, but also any review “otherwise” authorized.389 SSA section 1878 applies to pro-
vider payment claims,390 and SSA section 1869 generally applies to individual benefit or 
claim determinations under Medicare as well as national and local coverage determina-
tions.391 
IPAB’s preclusion provision seeks to forestall obstruction of the automatic process 
and strengthen the “binding” quality of the automatic proposal implementation, but it also 
provokes many questions. Will it undermine the legislative purpose of the IPAB statute, 
because there is no way to ensure that the proposal to be implemented reduces Medicare 
spending sufficiently (or does not cut Medicare excessively) much less whether it complies 
with the parameters laid out above, such as implementation without rationing? Medicare 
law boasts a fair number of other limitations on judicial review.392 At least one of these 
provisions, forcing aggrieved claimants to use the various special review channels that the 
Medicare statute authorizes, has been upheld by the Supreme Court in recent cases such 
                                                        
 386. Id. § 1899A(e)(3)(B)(i)(II). 
 387. Id. §§ 1899A(e)(3)(B)(ii)–(iii). 
 388. Id. § 1899A(e)(5). 
 389. Id. § 1899A(e)(5). Such review might include that which is under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), which provides 
judicial review “except to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review.”  
 390.   SSA § 1878 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (2014)). 
 391.   SSA § 1869 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2014)). 
 392. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) is incorporated within the Medicare regime by SSA § 1395ii, which makes 
§ 405(h) applicable to the Medicare program to the same extent, mutatis mutandis, as it is applicable to Social 
Security. SSA § 405(h)’s application means that even where there is federal question jurisdiction, there will be 
“no action . . . against the US . . . to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.” By upholding the 
preclusive effect of § 405(h), the Court is permitting Congress to designate the review path in § 405(g), or for 
Medicare, § 1868, as exclusive. 
53
Ho: Budgeting on Autopilot: Do Sequestration and the Independent Paym
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
HO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2015  3:20 PM 
748 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:695  
as Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care393 on the condition that some review is 
otherwise available. 
IPAB’s preclusion purports, however, to cut off both administrative and judicial re-
view, and may therefore raise concerns. Yet, the Medicare statute already includes some 
provisions denying administrative and judicial review of technical questions, such as the 
inflationary update for hospital payments or payment methodology.394 Indeed GRH also 
protected the Comptroller General’s computations of the deficit from any judicial or ad-
ministrative review.395 Despite the constitutional infirmity of placing final determination 
of the deficit breach triggering sequestration in the hands of a legislative officer, such as 
the Comptroller General,396 (relieving the court of the need to consider other problems 
with the Comptroller General’s role in GRH) the opinion of the D.C. District Court, whose 
judgment the Supreme Court affirmed in Bowsher v. Synar, took pains to discuss this ju-
dicial and administrative preclusion in dictum and found it unproblematic.397 This discus-
sion approvingly noted the limited scope of the preclusion, and one could argue that 
IPAB’s preclusion provision is similarly narrow and less absolute than it might appear at 
first glance. 
Because the IPAB preclusion language applies to the recommendations in a “pro-
posal,” it could be read, and under the constitutional avoidance canon, should be read, as 
allowing review if the savings are not in IPAB’s proposal alone, but in the Congressional 
substitute. Arguably, this review should obtain even if Congress did not modify the par-
ticular item challenged, as long as Congress had changed or substituted for other aspects 
of the proposal.398 Further, the language seems to preserve review of matters other than 
implementation. The proposal itself could perhaps be challenged, and one could imagine 
that a facial challenge in advance would escape the bar on review of implementation. Oth-
ers have argued that the preclusion might not bar certain procedural challenges.399 Again, 
these readings seems more likely in view of the court’s presumption of reviewability when 
the statute is silent.400 There are inherent limits to the reach of these preclusive measures. 
                                                        
 393. Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000). See also Bowen v. Mich. Acad. 
of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 678 (1986) (stating, in a challenge to the preclusion of review of amount 
determinations for individual provider payment, that the Court “conclude[s], that those matters which Congress 
did not leave to be determined in a ‘fair hearing’ conducted by the carrier—including challenges to the validity 
of the Secretary’s instructions and regulations—are not impliedly insulated from judicial review by 42 U.S.C. § 
1395ff.”). See SSA § 1868 for preclusion of review where the amount in determination is under $1000. 
 394. SSA § 1886(a)(1)(A)(i); 42 U.S.C. § 1395WW(D)(7)(B) (precluding review of the inflationary update to 
the payment schedule and “the establishment of the diagnosis-related groups” or DRGs, and “of the related meth-
odology for the classification of discharges within groups, and of the appropriate weighting of factors thereof 
. . .”). 
 395. GRH, supra note 142, § 274(h) (commanding that “[t]he economic data, assumptions, and methodologies 
used by the Comptroller General in computing the base levels of total revenues and total budget outlays . . . shall 
not be subject to review in any judicial or administrative proceeding.”). 
 396. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 397. Synar v. U.S., 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 398. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (Brennan J., distinguishing preclusion of review of deci-
sions made by an Administrator, in this case of the VA, versus decisions made by Congress, and reading preclu-
sive language to preserve review for Congressional decisions). 
 399. Fox, supra note 202, at 166 n.145. 
 400. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975). But see 
Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984) (remaining silent on the availability of judicial review in a 
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A due process claim by an individual provider or Medicare recipient would presumably 
still be available, as preclusion of review does not typically extend to constitutional chal-
lenges.401 
6. Self-Entrenching?: Sections 1899A(f) and (d)(3) 
A feature of the IPAB legislation that has aroused notice is the degree to which as-
pects of its design entrench or intentionally insulate laws against change by future Con-
gresses. First, the privileging procedures (or statutized internal House and Senate Rules) 
for Congressional consideration of IPAB’s proposals are entrenched by supermajority re-
quirement. As noted above, a majority of the House and a three-fifths vote of the Senate 
is required to waive any of the restrictions listed in “this subsection” (presumably subsec-
tion (d) of section 1899A), namely those restrictions limiting debate, amendments, mo-
tions, and other delaying devices.402 However, why could Congress not simply pass legis-
lation by ordinary procedures either changing those waiver requirements or directly 
changing the statutory language of those privileging procedures? Indeed the section in-
cludes the boilerplate language mentioned above suggesting Congress does not even have 
to pass such legislation bicamerally, which means each chamber would retain the ability 
to change its own rules by majority.403 Yet, some critics have read the language and struc-
ture of the IPAB authorizing measures to purport that the statutized rules regarding Con-
gress’ consideration of a substitute can be changed by one means alone, through the par-
ticular burdensome joint resolution described in section 1899A(f).404 
This brings us to the second form of self-entrenchment included in IPAB. The pre-
scribed joint resolution process also attaches to any attempt to change the provisions re-
quiring the Secretary to automatically implement the annual proposal when the process 
reaches that stage without Congressional bypass. According to the statute, Congress can 
discontinue the rules around Congressional “consideration and automatic implementation 
of the annual proposal of the [Board]”405 only in the first months of 2017,406 only with a 
joint resolution that contains an expressly prescribed statement,407 and only under certain 




                                                        
highly comprehensive scheme expresses Congress’ intent to preclude).  
 401. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). See generally Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability 
in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990). 
 402. SSA §§ 1899A(d)(3)(C)–(E). 
 403. Id. Again, assuming the nuclear option. 
 404. Cohen & Cannon, supra note 348. 
 405. SSA § 1899A(f)(1)(C).  
 406. Id. § 1899A(f)(1)(A). 
 407. Id. §§ 1899A(f)(1)(C)–(D). 
 408. Id. § 1899A(f)(2). For instance, ten hours are designated for debate and all points of order are waived 
against the joint resolution, except for those in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 
 409. Id. § 1899A(f)(2)(F). 
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a. The Ostensible Self-Entrenchment of Congressional Consideration of 
the Proposal 
As mentioned, this joint resolution can be understood to attach to two types of future 
Congressional action. The first type is any change to the statutized rules for Congress’ 
consideration of legislation bypassing the IPAB proposal, while the second is any change 
to the provisions concerning automatic implementation of the IPAB proposal. The under-
standing that the first type of Congressional action, changing the statutized rules of Con-
gress’ consideration, is subject to the limitations of the procedures surrounding the joint 
resolution derives somewhat indirectly from the language. First, it depends on the descrip-
tive language required for inclusion in the joint resolution.410 While nothing in the IPAB 
authorizing statute expressly states that change of the special statutized rules for the IPAB 
proposal is subject to this encumbered joint resolution procedure, the language describing 
such a joint resolution requires that the title and the language following the resolving 
clause of any such joint resolution include the phrase, “the discontinuation of the process 
for . . . consideration and automatic implementation . . . of the annual proposal of the 
Independent Payment Advisory Board. . . .”411 If this wording is dispositive, it would seem 
to restrict the Joint Resolution to only a complete discontinuation of the two processes, 
namely Congressional consideration and automatic implementation. What if Congress 
wished to discontinue only the “automatic implementation of the annual proposal” while 
still retaining its fast-track consideration of any proposal made by IPAB? What if it wished 
to make a more tailored revision to the IPAB statute? After all, one could imagine Con-
gress wishing to retain the IPAB process in 2020 and beyond, but merely modifying the 
automatic implementation language so that Congress could still arrest the automatic im-
plementation by passing a Congressional substitute achieving target savings. As discussed 
infra, it may alternatively wish to modify or even abolish the trigger. However, none of 
these options are mentioned in the obligatory language of the joint resolution, and indeed 
some of the options, such as changes to the trigger, are not prohibited or insulated against 
change anywhere else in the IPAB statute. Therefore these actions would presumably have 
to be pursued through some means other than the joint resolution. The joint resolution 
therefore cannot serve as the sole method for modifying the IPAB statute. 
Furthermore, subsection 1899A(d)(3)(C) declares, “[i]t shall not be in order in the 
Senate or the House of Representatives to consider any bill, resolution, amendment, or 
conference report that would repeal or otherwise change this subsection,”412 presumably 
referring to its own subsection, subsection (d), which sets forth the parameters and proce-
dures for “Congressional Consideration” of the IPAB proposal. These parameters include 
such crucial requirements as the limitation on delay and the prohibition against amend-
ments that breach the applicable savings target. 
However, the meaning of these two pieces of language together seems less than air-
tight. First, there is the issue of the other language in (d)(3), in the provision outlining 
“Limitation on Changes to the Board Recommendations.” Nowhere in that provision does 
                                                        
 410. Id. § 1899A(f). 
 411. Id. § 1899A(f)(C)(D) (emphasis added). 
 412. Id. § 1899(d)(3)(C).  
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it say that these “repeals or changes” that are otherwise not in order by means of (d)(3)(C) 
are subject to change by the joint resolution. Why would Congress fail to mention the joint 
resolution and its subsection designation, (f), in (d)(3)? Instead (d)(3) simply declares that 
such changes are not in order, and does not say that they would be in order under the joint 
resolution. Subsection (d)(3) does, however, refer to an entirely different channel for mak-
ing such changes in order. Subsection (d)(3)(E), which applies to any point of order in 
“[t]his paragraph,”413 does make clear that the (d)(3)(C) limitation against changes is sub-
ject to waiver, suspension, or appeal from chair rulings only by a three-fifths majority. The 
same language applies to (d)(4) waivers and suspensions of the statutized rules that attach 
to Congress’ consideration of the IPAB proposal, but not (d)(1) or (2), which address the 
procedures surrounding introduction and committee consideration of the IPAB pro-
posals.414 Thus, while this channel of waivers, suspensions and appeals, as opposed to the 
joint resolution channel, does not require a smaller majority, it is less encumbered in the 
sense that it is not time-limited to 2017. 
The language of (d)(5) further problematizes reliance on the mere recitation of the 
words “Congressional consideration” in the joint resolution’s descriptive title language, 
and language following the resolving clause to conclude that changes to the subsection (d) 
statutized rules are exclusively limited to the method of joint resolution.415 Subsection 
(d)(5) also contains the boilerplate language stating that subsections (d) and (f)(2) are en-
acted “with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules,” 
further undermining the exclusivity of the joint resolution as the method for changing the 
privileged Congressional treatment of the IPAB proposals.416 
b. The Ostensible Self-Entrenchment of Automatic Implementation of the 
Proposal 
The exclusive channeling of changes to the automatic implementation mechanism 
through the joint resolution process is somewhat clearer than the exclusive channeling of 
changes to the process of Congressional consideration of a substitute. With regard to 
changes to automatic implementation, the IPAB authorizing statute deploys a “notwith-
standing” clause. According to section 1899A(e)(1), “[n]otwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, the Secretary shall, except as provided in this paragraph (3), implement the 
recommendations contained in a proposal submitted by the Board or the President to Con-
gress pursuant to this section . . .”417 And the joint resolution described in (f)(1) is listed 
                                                        
 413. See generally SSA § 1899A(d)(3) (noting that similar language requiring supermajorities on waivers and 
appeals from Chair rulings are contained in subsection (d)(4)(B)(v), and this might be read to refer to all the 
statutized rules for “Expedited Procedure” under (d)(4), including limitations on amendments, Senate limits on 
debate, consideration in conference, etc., but not facilitated procedures for introduction, referral, committee con-
sideration, and discharge which are in subsections (d)(1) and (2). Of course if the (d)(4)(B)(v) and (d)(3)(E) 
mentions of “[t]his paragraph” in fact refer to all of subsection (d) on Congressional consideration, then those 
facilitated procedures would not be excluded from the entrenching three-fifths requirement on waivers). 
 414. Id. § 1899A(d)(1)–(4). 
 415. Id. § 1899A(d)(5). 
 416. Id. 
 417. This would therefore require implementation of the proposal unless the exceptions apply, and those ex-
ceptions include the Congressional bypass, or the specifically burdened joint resolution, as well as the limited 
exception if per capita NHE exceeds per capita Medicare growth. 
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as an exception in the afore-referenced paragraph (3). So, the notwithstanding clause 
claims that this IPAB provision, i.e., that of automatic implementation, trumps “any other 
provision of law,” including any subsequent provision of law, unless the automatic imple-
mentation is changed by means of the joint resolution pathway with its attendant time 
limits referred to in the paragraph (3) exceptions.418 However, we have described earlier 
some general vulnerabilities of notwithstanding clauses, noting that courts often fail to 
uphold them even against later implied repeals—not to speak of later express repeals. 
Moreover, creative drafting could easily block or circumvent automatic implemen-
tation. To mention just one example, Congress could pass measures that increase Medicare 
spending, but also include language exempting those measures from counting toward per 
capita Medicare cost growth in the IPAB trigger. The IPAB trigger language is in subsec-
tion (c), whereas the supermajority joint resolution requirements protect only against 
amendment of subsections (d) and (e), which address Congressional consideration and au-
tomatic implementation of the proposal.419 To disable the trigger would disable automatic 
implementation as well. 
Under a superficial reading of the language of section 1899A, Congress’ future ac-
tions might appear burdened in an additional way, apart from the burdens on its ability to 
consider the IPAB proposals, or its ability to change the conditions under which it consid-
ers those proposals and their implementation.420 Congress’ other Medicare-related actions 
in legislation unrelated to the IPAB proposals may also be chilled, if not thwarted. The 
statutory language not only limits Congress’ ability to consider cost-noncompliant 
measures in the course of activity governed by this subsection (d),421 namely, those 
measures that arise in the course of considering IPAB proposals. But in (d)(3)(B), it also 
forbids the Senate or House, even in activity not “pursuant to this section,” from consid-
ering cost-noncompliant measures if they could be characterized as “repeal[ing] or other-
wise chang[ing] the recommendations of the Board.”422 If, for instance, under the older 
SGR physician payment formula, IPAB were to have recommended strict application of 
cuts to the Medicare physician fee schedule in contravention of yearly Congressional over-
rides, it is possible that subsequent periodic independent legislation to delay the SGR up-
date adjustment would have been in violation of this language. Arguably, its decision to 
reform the physician payment formula, as it did in the Medicare Access and CHIP Reau-
thorization Act of 2015 (MACRA),423 could still, under this hypothetical situation, have 
been considered to be “otherwise chang[ing] the recommendations of the Board,” even 
though Congress was not acting pursuant to section 1899A in passing MACRA. Indeed, 
this overbroad dragnet could capture many things Congress does on a topic that has already 
been dealt with by IPAB. 
So do IPAB recommendations claim the field from Congress and box out other Med-
icare bills in the area? It seems that such a reading could not prevail against the general 
                                                        
 418. Id. § 1899A(e)(1)–(3). 
 419. Id. § 1899A(c). 
 420. Id. § 1899A. 
 421. Id. § 1899A(d)(3)(A).  
 422. Id. § 1899A(d)(3)(B). 
 423. See supra note 200. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10.  
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principle that later law will defeat former law if it conflicts with or occupies the field.424 
Indeed, Tim Jost reads the language to continue to permit independent Congressional leg-
islation to increase Medicare spending.425 Presumably in his reading, Congress also pre-
serves its ability to cut Medicare.426 In sum, if independent legislation affecting the items 
of Medicare spending already modified by the Board would not be blocked as “otherwise 
chang[ing] the recommendations of the Board,” then Congress enjoys much more leeway 
in subsequent legislation to stymie automatic implementation of IPAB’s proposal—even 
in years 2020 and after when its ability to pass a substitute is curtailed. 
7. IPAB Displays Properties of Legalism 
The IPAB mechanism is a way to decide to cut Medicare from behind a “veil of 
ignorance,” elevating the general and ignoring particularities.427 Just as Congress enjoyed 
political cover under BRAC, with IPAB, Congress can disclaim responsibility for the 
choice of particular reductions and the consequences to particular stakeholders because of 
those cuts. Congress can claim simply to have voted for the principle of cutting. This 
stance reflects the classic “liberal” tiering of law’s universal constraints from ordinary 
particular interests, passions, and inclinations. 
The IPAB mechanism purports to operate by separating certain categories from or-
dinary rules, and subjecting them to higher hurdles, constituting them as “higher law.” 
Thus, the imperative to cut Medicare is “higher law,” only to be changed by extraordinary 
procedures. 
It may appear that the preclusion of review provision in IPAB runs counter to the 
hypothesis that IPAB is intended to operate by means of subjecting Congress to the force 
of “legalism” and binding Congress’ decisions by “rules.” Yet, given the realities of judi-
cial review as a weaponized forum for interest group obstruction tactics, a more plausible 
reading is that Congress is trying to strengthen the “binding” quality of IPAB’s proposals 
rather than exposing those proposals to interest-based contest. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: SEQUESTRATION AND IPAB, CONGRESS HAS ALREADY SLIPPED ITS CUFFS, 
AMPLIGYING POWER DIFFERENCES AND REDUCING TRANSPARENCY 
Indeed, developments suggest that Congress will take steps to circumvent the en-
trenching law. The President’s FY 2014 and 2015 budgets proposed amending IPAB’s 
                                                        
 424. See, e.g., Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 659 (1974) (holding that earlier savings clause, 1 U.S.C. § 
109, declaring later statutory repeals of penalties ineffective “unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide,” 
did not nullify later repeals that failed to employ specific language, as long as they repealed by fair implication). 
 425. Tim Jost, The Independent Payment Advisory Board, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. PERSP. 103, 105 (2010). 
 426. Independent legislation cutting Medicare spending would also be freighted because it would as a pre-
sumptive matter reduce the baseline against which Medicare spending growth is measured for the purposes of 
the trigger, and could thereby cause what would have formerly been rates of Medicare growth within the target 
rate to suddenly exceed the trigger threshold. Because that kind of legislation would asymmetrically ratchet 
Medicare spending down it might actually disincentivize Congressional action to pass legislation bending the 
cost-curve, and create a use-or-lose dynamic for Medicare stakeholders. 
 427. Brito, supra note 173, at 143. 
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targeted Medicare growth rate to GDP plus 0.5 percent.428 Again, this proposal appears 
straightforward since the entrenching supermajoritarian amendment handicap does not ap-
ply to the trigger, only to the provisions stipulating automatic implementation and the pro-
visions structuring Congressional consideration of a substitute. While Congress did not 
enact this provision in its “modest” budget and spending deal for Fiscal Year 2014, it did 
reduce appropriations for IPAB by ten million dollars,429 just as it had in the continuing 
resolutions for FY 2012 and FY 2013 spending.430 
Congress has even taken unicameral action to change IPAB’s binding force. In Jan-
uary 2013, the Republican leadership in the House adopted a House rule declaring that 
section 1899A(d) of the IPAB legislation “shall not apply” in the current Congress, thereby 
rejecting the special procedures that section 1899A had established for Congressional con-
sideration of IPAB recommendations.431 Because subsection (d) also contains (d)(3)(D), 
which imposes the three-fifths supermajority threshold for waiving the requirements of 
section (d), entrenchment is undermined. Also because (d)(3)(A) requires Congress’ sub-
stitute to achieve equivalent savings, IPAB’s target savings can now be sidestepped by 
Congress. As (d)(3)(B) contains the point of order against other non-IPAB-related legis-
lation that might repeal or change IPAB’s proposal, the House is now free to pass subse-
quent bills that counteract, substitute for, or prevent any automatic implementation of 
IPAB’s proposal.432 
Congress has similarly modified the sequester. On January 2, 2013, in ATRA, the 
date of the sequester was delayed to March 2013, which concentrated the impact of the 
sequester into a shorter timeframe.433 Congress undertook a number of spending changes 
in ATRA. To take health entitlement spending as a case in point, ATRA included another 
“Doc Fix” which pushed the scheduled 26.5 percent SGR formula cut to Medicare physi-
cian payments to the end of 2013.434 It also acted to, among other things, extend the ex-
ceptions process for the Medicare therapy cap and extend current policy for rural health, 
                                                        
 428. OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2014); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FISCAL YEAR 2014 
BUDGET IN BRIEF: STRENGTHENING HEALTH AND OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL AMERICANS 56 (2013), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/budget/. 
 429. SSA § 1899A(m)(1)–(2) (authorizing $15 million for in FY 2012 appropriations, adjusted by CPI-U for 
subsequent years, and sourcing these funds from transfers from the Medicare Part A and Part B Trust Funds). 
 430. The Consolidated Appropriations Act 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–74, § 525, 125 Stat. 786 (2011) rescinded 
$10 million of IPAB’s appropriation for FY 2012). The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations 
Act 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–6, § 1521, 127 Stat. 198 (2013) did the same for Fiscal Year 2013.  
 431. H.R. Res. 5, §3(a), 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted). 
 432. Sarah Kliff, Republicans Can’t Stop IPAB but the Might Slow it Down, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/08/republicans-cant-stop-ipab-but-they-
might-slow-it-down/. 
 433. American Taxpayer Relief Act (“ATRA”), Pub. L. No. 112–240, § 901(b), 126 Stat. 2313 (2013). Indeed 
the amount of the sequestration overall was revised slightly downward shortly thereafter in the Consolidated and 
Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–6, § 1521, 127 Stat. 198 (2013), from $85.3 
billion in budget reductions to $80.5 billion for Fiscal Year 2013. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-14-452, 2013, SEQUESTRATION: SELECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES REDUCED SOME SERVICES AND 
INVESTMENTS, WHILE TAKING SHORT-TERM ACTIONS TO MITIGATE EFFECTS, at 6 (2014).  
 434. ATRA, supra note 433, § 603.   
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including the ambulance add-on payments, the payment adjustment for low-volume hos-
pitals, and the Medicare Dependent Hospital program.435 The specific interests benefited 
here include not just physicians, but others favored by the powerful rural Senators of the 
Senate Finance Committee. 
A Congressional precommitment to fund health care (Medicare) was thus trimmed 
by a Congressional precommitment to cut spending across-the-board (sequestration), 
though Medicare was partly protected from such sequestration (exceptions) with Congress 
additionally increasing Medicare payments for benefit specific health sector interest 
groups.  
Other legislation has also restored otherwise sequestrable funds to special interests, 
namely business travelers, the meat industry, and the defense industry. Despite the Ad-
ministration’s call for wholesale revisitation of sequestration,436 Congress had, in the im-
mediate aftermath of the March 2013 sequester, made only piecemeal efforts to address 
funding. It restored funds for air traffic controllers to prevent the delays that were clogging 
the airports.437 By law, government food inspection services are required to be on-site for 
meat packers to keep their plants open, and the meat industry won a reprieve from cuts to 
their inspector.438 Last, but not least, Congress granted the Pentagon flexibility to avoid 
some of the effects of sequestration.439 
But a somewhat more comprehensive effort to provide sequestration relief did ulti-
mately pass. The FY 2014 “modest” budget and spending deal440 modified the sequester 
by easing the discretionary spending caps for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 and generating 
eighty-five billion dollars in revenue to offset the sequester cuts.441 The list of programs 
spared the full brunt of the sequestration is longer. Head Start cuts were fully rescinded. 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) received partial restoration. Defense cuts were 
mitigated.442 Meanwhile, to offset some of this new funding, Medicare sequestration 
(though limited to only two percent) was extended for two additional years beyond when 
                                                        
 435. Id. §§ 602–06.  
 436. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Over-
view  [hereinafter President Obama’s FY 2014 Budget Proposal] (stating that the President’s proposed FY 2014 
budget substitutes for the $1.2 billion in cuts). 
 437. Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–9, 127 Stat. 443 (2013). See also David Rogers, 
FAA Fix Leads to Grief for Hal Rogers, POLITICO (Apr. 30, 2013, 11:33 PM), ww.polit-
ico.com/story/2013/04/faa-fix-hal-rogers-aviation-air-travel-90800.html (recounting how “the meat packers got 
$19 million in March to protect against furloughs of food safety inspectors [and t]he FAA controllers are back 
on the job after $253 million was shifted from airport construction projects under the deal last week”).  
 438. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–6, 127 Stat. 198, 207–
08 (2013). 
 439. Id. at 279; 159 Cong. Rec. S1986 (daily ed. March 20, 2013) (amendment offered by Sen. Mark Pryor).  
 440. Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–67, 127 Stat. 1166 (2014). 
 441. Lori Montgomery, Senate Passes Bipartisan Budget Agreement, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-pass-bipartisan-budget-agree-
ment/2013/12/18/54fd3a1a-6807-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html. 
 442. Cf. David Farenthold & Ed O’Keefe, Piecemeal Funding During the Government Shutdown, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/house-appropriations-bills-during-shut-
down/ (showing the list of programs that House Republicans proposed should receive selective appropriations 
during the government shutdown).  
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automatic cuts for all other programs would expire.443 At the same time, the administrative 
budget for the operation of the fifteen-member IPAB was largely de-funded.444 
What are we to make of this? Congress has ostensibly precommitted itself to fund 
Medicare as an entitlement for all those who met the eligibility criteria. Later, Congress 
turns around and pre-commits itself to cut entitlement spending by sequestration, even as 
it leaves tax spending untouched. However, it also wants Medicare to be exempted from 
automatic cuts above two percent. Certain interest groups must also receive additional 
payments under ATRA and other legislation. But Congress also wants Medicare spending 
to be cut more, or at least for longer, in order to fund NIH and defense. At the same time, 
it wishes to cripple the independent agency designed to cut Medicare, arguably in a more 
expert manner. No wonder the U.S. Government Accountability Office found in a recent 
report that CMS faced “challenges in applying sequestration in accordance with the law 
and changing budget parameters.”445 In a forum where more of the programs can be traded 
off against one another to strike a comprehensive spending plan, the additional headwind 
that programs face when confronting the sequester seems to produce not so much princi-
pled, transparent rule-bound results as extremely complex, incoherent results. 
What do we gain from trying to conduct “preference aggregation,” welfare trade-
offs, or “substantive” decision-making that purports to be the stuff of politics and demo-
cratic rule using the mode of legalistic, “principled” decision-making? Are the proponents 
of entrenchment, despite their commitment to the superiority of law over politics, para-
doxically telegraphing that the two are no different? 
This discussion has revealed that the promise of entrenchment qua entrenchment is 
a mirage. There are those who argue that entrenchment should be possible, even in these 
deeply political matters involving revenue and spending. They are driven by the same 
norm as those who deploy it, despite its ineffectiveness, and they insist that we honor it 
out of false necessity. We have shown they are both arguing from an ideological claim that 
preexisting rules should govern these decisions and that the outcomes of these fights 
should be pre-determined. They are arguing from legalism. 
The notion that we are mechanistically protected from granular day-to-day decision 
is illusory. Oddly, Posner and Vermeule admit as much, even in their call for entrench-
ment. Even if precommitment or entrenchment were available, they say, it would not pro-
vide determinate results: 
 
Legal actors constantly must make judgments about whether a statute 
conflicts with a previous or hierarchically superior enactment. When an 
interpreter, such as a court or legislative body, decides whether a federal 
law preempts a state law, whether a federal or state law conflicts with 
the Constitution, or whether a transaction violates the tax law, it must be 
                                                        
 443. Michael McAuliff, Budget Deal Whacks Medicare Providers, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 10, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/10/budget-medicare-cuts_n_4422676.html.  
 444. Jessica Zigmond, Reform Update: Its Funding Gutted, IPAB Fades into the Background, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article20140124/NEWS/301249973.   
 445. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE supra note 433, at 11–12. 
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able to identify real conflicts that are concealed by statutory (or transac-
tional) indirection. This task involves a well-known problem of inter-
pretive theory, variously labeled as a “form and substance” problem, a 
“rules and standards” problem, a problem of the choice between “textu-
alism” and “purposivism,” or a problem of “circumvention” or “eva-
sion.”446 
 
What then does the vain use of precommitment, despite its inability to change our 
decisions at time two, accomplish? If the mechanism fails, norms remain. Proponents of 
precommitment hope that those who do not know, or do not want to believe that rules fail 
in this arena will adhere nonetheless, and they will call for rule-abidance from political 
convention if nothing else. Legalism as political norm weighs in at the margin against any 
political norms that run contrary in that instance.  
But if people wish as a matter of ideology to believe that they can bind themselves 
and should regard themselves as bound and will enforce norms about binding in the form 
of imposing political consequences, what objection can we have? I argue there are two 
types of bad faith operating. One type is the disingenuity of pretending to be bound when 
one is not—the bad faith of false necessity. 
However, there is a second type of bad faith that should caution us to be wary of 
these devices and inspect them carefully for whom they serve. This is the bad faith of 
decision makers pretending to be apolitical in their decisions when they are not. Precom-
mitments masquerade as a neutral principle with consent among equals; yet, they are in a 
collective context too easily manipulated. In scrutinizing the particular examples of IPAB 
and the sequester, we have shown that these devices do not serve reason in binding against 
passions or interests, but they are used by some to bind others to serve the first group’s 
passions and interests. One example of non-neutral application is apparent insofar as the 
sequester locks-in a bias favoring, cutting spending rather than raising revenue. Reduced 
tax deductions and automatic revenue increases could have been included as part of the 
response to large deficits.447 Thus, the failure to include revenue raisers along with spend-
ing sequestration is a policy choice. 
IPAB is asymmetrical in this way as well. In a level competition between the norm 
to prioritize Medicare and the norm to cut Medicare, the outcome, most would agree, 
would depend. It would be a situationally contingent, particularistic decision. IPAB tips 
the scales, adding the norm of legalism to the side favoring cuts, and, as we have seen, 
legalism claims general applicability regardless of the situation. Congress at time one is 
wagering on one side of the question, betting against investing more money in Medicare 
and consenting to pay the political price of overriding or modifying IPAB’s entrenchment 
provisions should a pro-Medicare-spending norm arise in the future. 
These precommitments do not fall behind the veil of ignorance. They are not enacted 
from the original position. They are used in a forum where everyone is seeking strategic 
                                                        
 446. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1669–70. 
 447. The idea of automatic revenue increases pegged to Social Security or other triggers is not new. See, e.g., 
E. Donald Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 317, 358–61 (1987); Stith, 
supra note 13, at 627; Westmoreland, supra note 13, at 1562 n.38. 
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advantage, trying to impose extra gridlock (even beyond that already assumed by positive 
political theory) to lock-in their preferences with greater security against their opponents. 
In addition, the use of precommitment may obfuscate the actual preferences enacted, as is 
the case with the ping-pong treatment of Medicare under IPAB and sequestration. The two 
case studies also reveal that Congressional precommitments in the budgeting arena am-
plify the difference between status quo majorities and minorities. The sequester was never 
a penalty default for Republicans that would force them to the table to negotiate an alter-
native that would head-off sequestration.448 Instead, it was a majoritarian default decimat-
ing every social program that did not enjoy conventional popular support.449 The reason 
for this tilt is that the popular interests, such as those favoring relief for business travelers 
facing flight delays, could “contract around” the sequester by lobbying Congress to relieve 
the sequestration of funds to air traffic controllers. However, the disempowered, vulnera-
ble, minority interests, including the neediest Native American families,450 could not. 
Posner and Vermeule might respond in two ways. To the first form of bad faith sur-
rounding Congressional precommitments, pretending to be bound when you are not, they 
might argue that the solution is simple enough: we could decide to make precommitments 
binding. And to the second form of bad faith, pretending to be impartial in the deployment 
of a tool that is deeply political, Posner and Vermeule might say, but it is available to 
anyone to not only wield politically, but also to combat politically; after all, we all know 
that the application of “prior law” cannot produce automatic answers and requires judg-
ment at every turn. They might point to the numerous opportunities that opponents have 
to defeat precommitments that they dislike—including opportunities to insert special ex-
emptions for their favored political interests or opportunities to “contract around” the pre-
commitment, as the proponents of Head Start eventually did. However, that rejoinder ac-
tually depends on the precommitment failing to bind. In other words, it depends on the 
continued operation of the first form of bad faith. The proponents of precommitment are 
in a double-bind where solving one form of bad faith exacerbates the other. 
Our politics has folded in on itself. A perennial concern of legal scholars is the in-
trusion of politics into law, but here we have the intrusion of “legalism” into politics. When 
Congress seeks to subject its political decisions to “formal rationality,” “formal justice,” 
and “rule of law”451 above all other political values, does it actually relieve itself of hard 
choices in deciding priorities? What does it mean that we are making the kinds of value 
judgments that liberalism deems to be beyond legalism’s domain by appealing to legalistic 
norms? And how does our polity recover competing modes of discourse? 
                                                        
 448. Contra Dorf, supra note 302 (arguing that it was). 
 449. Ferejohn & Friedman, supra note 304, at 857–59. 
 450. Byron Dorgan, Broken Promises, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2013, at A27. 
 451. Judith Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1, 5–6 
(Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monohan eds., 1987). See Weber, supra note 325. 
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